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This issue represents a first foray into a new era—one without Judge SteveLeben at the helm as editor. As you can see from Judge Leben’s final Edi-tor’s Note in Volume 53:4, it takes a village of judges to replace him and
the excellent job that he has done over the past 20 years. The five editors (Pro-
fessor Eve Brank, and Judges David Shakes, David Prince, Devin Odell, and I)
are grateful for his thoughtful leadership and guidance, and apologize to him
and our readers in advance as we bumble our way through our first year as edi-
tors of this esteemed publication. Thank you all for your patience as we learn
how to fill some very big shoes. Included in this issue is a tribute to Judge
Leben, and I commend it to you so that you can better appreciate the impact
that Judge Leben has had on this publication, and on the American Judges
Association as a whole.
In addition to the tribute to Judge Leben,
you’ll find a number of articles of interest
regarding a variety of issues of concern to
judges in the U.S. and Canada. In our
“Thoughts from Canada” column, Judge
Wayne Gorman addresses a timely issue of
interest to all judges: how stereotypical think-
ing can impact how we assess credibility of
witnesses, particularly in sexual assault trials.
Given the rise of specialty courts, Kaplan,
Miller, and Wood review the history and prac-
tices of problem-solving courts and provide a
look forward at how those courts can inform
practices in the future. In that same vein of innovation, Paula Hannaford-Agor
provides an assessment of civil-justice-reform practices. Victor Eugene Flango
provides a thoughtful review of sentencing options in impaired-driving cases.
And last, but certainly not least, Judge Kim Berkeley Clark shares with us her
acceptance speech presented to the National Center for State Courts in Novem-
ber 2017, when she was awarded the William H. Rehnquist Award for Judicial
Excellence. I found her words inspiring me to be the best judge I can be for the
people in my jurisdiction. I trust you will be similarly inspired.
The crossword puzzle has a personalized theme honoring our retiring editor,
so take a moment to enjoy that fun and subtle tribute. We are very pleased to
announce that in future issues you will see a regular ethics column by Cynthia
Gray. As many of you know, Ms. Gray is the director of the Center for Judicial
Ethics that is part of the National Center for State Courts. In this recurring fea-
ture, Ms. Gray will share with us recent cases and advisory opinions that will
help all of us to avoid ethical pitfalls that can sometimes sneak up on us. For a
preview of her writing and an understanding of what a great repository of
knowledge she is, check out her weekly blog: www.ncscjudicialethicsblog.org.
Thanks for your patience during the transition of editors. Steve, you will be
missed. —JKF
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My dear colleagues and Court Review readers, greet-ings. As I wrote this, I had just returned from anexcellent AJA Executive Committee meeting in the
Napa Valley, which focused on our three linked goals this year:
(1) enhancing the value of AJA membership for those who are
unable to attend conferences, (2) building on AJA’s advances
toward greater diversity in our organization and on the nation’s
benches, as well as achieving better understanding of and
responses to diversity issues in our courts, and (3) strengthen-
ing AJA’s ties to other national court-oriented organizations,
including reaching out to national minority-
lawyer organizations with judicial divisions and
finding new ways to collaborate with our national
court-oriented partners. Since then, I have
attended the Conference of Chief Justices (CCJ)
midyear meeting in Henderson, Nevada, followed
about two weeks later by a visit to the National
Association for Court Management (NACM)
midyear meeting in Orange County, California.
My next update will talk in more detail about my
latest trip, to our simply outstanding AJA midyear
conference in Memphis, Tennessee.  Justice Tor-
res and Judge Betty Moore planned that excellent event, but I
think Justice Torres and I both agree that it is Judge Moore, the
conference chair, who really deserves a standing ovation for all
she did to make that one of our best conferences ever. 
I think our goals this year are important, and I have been
reflecting on why, so that I could try to discuss that in this col-
umn. A recent jury-selection experience in my court helped to
illuminate what I want to say. The lawyers asked the jurors to
state their opinions about immigration and immigrants. The
50-odd jurors in the panel engaged very seriously with this
question. They expressed some range of opinion: some indi-
cated their desire that current immigration laws be enforced,
some said they wanted to see both enforcement of existing law
and reform to allow immigrants a path to citizenship, and
some talked about how much they want to lower barriers to
immigration. But what juror after juror discussed was how
much stronger and richer the United States is as a nation
because of our immigrant foundation. They pointed out that
all of us who are not Native American or First Nations in her-
itage are immigrants or descended from immigrants to North
America. They talked about the ways the United States has
benefited from the work, patriotism, and enthusiasm of its
immigrants. They discussed how fascinating and enriching it
is to live in a place informed by many cultures, languages, and
religious beliefs. The jurors, including the significant number
who had been born outside North America, talked about their
passionate support for being part of a nation that is a haven for
the persecuted, a beacon of liberty, and a respecter of every
human being’s right to pursue happiness and to receive equal
treatment under the law. 
Perhaps apropos of these reflections, I will highlight a book
I read recently for the Law and Literature program at the CCJ
conference. It is Sweet Promised Land, by Robert Laxalt. The
book is about his immigrant father, Dominique, a Basque shep-
herd from the Pyrenees area who immigrated to the United
States and married Laxalt’s mother, also a Basque immigrant. 
People with backgrounds like these became
sheepherders and cowboys in the mountains of
western states like Nevada, Idaho, and Oregon.
Dominique was wealthy and successful for a
time, and when he was not, he returned to being
a simple sheepherder. America became his true
home, as he realized when he finally returned to
the Pyrenees for a visit late in life. His children
were all successful, and one may be well known
to you: Paul Laxalt, who was a Senator from
Nevada, Governor of Nevada, and General Chair-
man of the Republican National Committee. 
To me, this jury discussion and this book highlight some key
common concepts on which our membership in the AJA rests.
One of these is our appreciation of the immense value that our
populations’ diversity has brought to our national heritages as
American and Canadian judges. Another is the respect we all
feel for the rule of law and its bedrock assumption that all per-
sons are equal before the law, equally endowed with rights and
responsibilities, and equally deserving of opportunity, safety,
and liberty. A third is the critical importance that we all
thoughtfully share our experiences, discuss our common chal-
lenges, learn how to do our jobs to the very best of our ability,
and work together professionally so that each of us can
enhance the delivery of equal justice under the law to the peo-
ple who appear in our courts.
I hope you agree with me that our association together can
help to do these things, and—whether or not you come to con-
ferences—that is a key value of being an AJA member. I hope,
too, that you feel how worthwhile it is for all of us to rededi-
cate ourselves to celebrating our diversity and enhancing it.
And finally, I hope you agree that is fruitful and worthwhile for
AJA us to reach out to and cooperate with other national court
organizations, including both our existing partners and the
national minority legal organizations with judicial divisions. 
Please re-dedicate yourself to these goals in your AJA com-
mittees. I hope to see many of you at our fall conference in




1. Interestingly, one judge has cautioned against “the error of stereo-
typical thinking that sexual assault complainants are always
truthful.” See R. v. Dufresne, 2017 YKTC 45 (Can.).
2. Justice Camp subsequently resigned.
3. The Canadian Judicial Council is a federal body created under the
Judges Act, R.S.C. 1985, c J-1. (Can.). It deals with complaints
made against federally appointed judges (i.e., Supreme Court
judges). Each province has a provincial judicial council, which
deals with complaints against provincial court judges.
4. CAN. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, IN THE MATTER OF AN INQUIRY PURSUANT TO
S. 63(1) OF THE JUDGES ACT REGARDING THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE
ROBIN CAMP, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE INQUIRY COM-
MITTEE TO THE CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL (2016) [hereinafter the
Inquiry Report]. The inquiry report can be found at www.cjc-
ccm.gc.ca (search for “Inquiry Report).
5. [2014] CarswellAlta 2756 (Can. Alta.). 
There has been a great deal of controversy lately in Canadaover trial judges purportedly resorting to stereotypicalreasoning in assessing the credibility of witnesses, partic-
ularly complainants in sexual assault trials.1
This issue came to a head with a recommendation by the
Canadian Judicial Council to the Minister of Justice that a trial
judge be removed from office based upon his conduct (i.e.,
comments during a sexual assault trial).2 The recommendation
arose out of a complaint had been made to the Canadian Judi-
cial Council concerning former Justice Robin Camp.3 The
Council’s inquiry committee concluded that Justice Camp
“relied on discredited myths and stereotypes about women and
victim-blaming during the Trial and in his Reasons for Judg-
ment” (at paragraph 6).4
In this column, I intend to review the decision of the Judi-
cial Council in relation to former Justice Camp. I then intend
to review how allegations of improper stereotypical thinking
have been dealt with by various Canadian appeal courts and,
in one case, the Supreme Court of Canada. 
THE COMPLAINT
The Camp complaint arose as a result of a sexual assault
trial conducted by Judge Camp in R. v. Wagar.5
In Wagar, the accused was charged with the offence of sex-
ual assault. The complainant, A.B., testified that she was sexu-
ally assaulted by the accused in the bathroom of an acquain-
tance’s apartment during a party. The accused testified that A.B.
consented to the sexual activity.
Justice Camp acquitted the accused. On appeal, the acquit-
tal was overturned (see 2015 ABCA 327). The Alberta Court of
Appeal indicated that it was “persuaded that sexual stereotypes
and stereotypical myths, which have long since been discred-
ited, may have found their way into the trial judge’s judgment”
(at paragraph 4).
During the course of the trial, Justice Camp made com-
ments and asked questions, which formed the subject matter
of the subsequent complaint.
For instance, during the submissions of counsel, Justice
Camp suggested that “young woman want to have sex, partic-
ularly if they’re drunk” (see paragraph 92 of the Inquiry
Report). In addition, during the examination of the com-
plainant, Justice Camp asked the complainant several ques-
tions (at paragraph 137 of the Inquiry Report):
Q. But when—when he was using—when he was trying
to insert his penis, your bottom was down in the
basin. Or am I wrong?
A. My—my vagina was not in the bowl of the basin when
he was having intercourse with me.
Q. All right. Which then leads me to the question: Why
not—why didn’t you just sink your bottom into the
basin so he couldn’t penetrate you?
A. I was drunk.
Q. And when your ankles were held together by your
jeans, your skinny jeans, why couldn’t you just keep
your knees together?
A. (NO VERBAL RESPONSE)
Q. You’re shaking your head.
A. I don’t know.
Finally, in his reasons for acquitting, Justice Camp made the
following comments to the accused (at paragraph 224 of the
Inquiry Report):
And I don’t expect you to concentrate the whole time,
but I want you to listen very carefully to what I’m saying
right at the beginning. The law and the way that people
approach sexual activity has changed in the last 30 years.
I want you to tell your friends, your male friends, that
they have to be far more gentle with women. They have
to be far more patient. And they have to be very careful.
THOUGHTS FROM CANADA • A COURT REVIEW COLUMN
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6. CAN. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, IN THE MATTER OF AN INQUIRY PURSUANT TO
S. 63(1) OF THE JUDGES ACT REGARDING THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE
ROBIN CAMP, REPORT TO THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE, para. 24 (2017).
7. In R. v. Achuil, 2017 ABPC 292 (Can.), it was indicated that in
“assessing credibility, generalized stereotypical thinking must be
avoided regardless of the nature of the witness” (at paragraph 19).
The Court suggested that “there are a number of such myths in
sexual assault cases which have been reviewed in numerous cases.
The myths in summary form are as follows:
1. The Court may not draw an inference with respect to a com-
plainant’s credibility based on perceptions as to how a com-
plainant should react to a sexual assault.  
2. No adverse inference against the credibility of the complainant
may be drawn that is based on a lack of evidence of physical
injury or struggle.
3. No adverse inference against the credibility of the complainant
may be drawn that is based on the post offence demeanour or
behaviour of the complainant. 
4. No adverse inference against the credibility of the com-
plainant may be drawn that is solely based upon evidence of
questionable moral character such as the consumption of
alcohol, controlled drugs, or other behaviour infringing on
‘moral character.’”
8. This issue arose in a rather peculiar fashion in the case of R. v.
Dowholis, 2016 ONCA 801, (Can.). In Downholis, the accused
was convicted of three counts of aggravated sexual assault. The
offences involved the accused participating in homosexual sexual
encounters. One of the jurors appeared on a radio show both dur-
ing and after the trial. The juror made a number of homophobic
comments during the radio shows. In setting aside the convic-
tions, the Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that the juror’s con-
duct created the impression of an unfair trial (at paragraphs 44
and 45 ):
The likelihood that a bias against gay men would affect
the juror’s decision-making process is greater given his will-
ingness to publicly disregard instructions, engage in homo-
phobic rhetoric, and mock the court process. The issue is
not whether the juror meant what he said. Nor is it whether
he was in fact unfair. The issue is the impression that his
conduct created.
The impression created by the juror’s conduct goes beyond a bias
against gay men. A reasonable observer would have the impression
that the juror lacked respect for the justice system. This goes
directly to the perception of fairness.
To protect themselves, they have to be very careful.
The Canadian Judicial Council convened a committee to
consider the complaint and make recommendations. 
THE INQUIRY REPORT
In recommending Justice Camp’s removal from the bench,
the Inquiry Committee suggested that Justice Camp’s com-
ments during the trial were designed to “promote discredited
sexist stereotypes” (at paragraph 276). The Inquiry Committee
indicated that “Judges are not viewed simply as participants in
the justice system. They are expected to be leaders of its ethos
and exemplars of its values” (at paragraph 289). 
THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL
The Judicial Council accepted the Inquiry Committee’s rec-
ommendation for removal. The Council indicated that “[t]he
Judge’s misconduct was manifestly serious and reflected a sus-
tained pattern of beliefs of a particularly deplorable kind,
regardless of whether he was conscious of it or not.”6
The Council concluded that only the Judge’s removal from
office would restore the public’s confidence in the criminal jus-
tice system (at paragraph 47):
In our view, the statements made by Justice Camp
during the trial and in his decision, the values implicit in
those statements and the way in which he conducted
himself are so antithetical to the contemporary values of
our judicial system with respect to the manner in which
complainants in sexual assault cases should be treated
that, in our view, confidence in the system cannot be
maintained unless the system disassociates itself from
the image which the Judge, by his statements and
approach, represents in the mind of a reasonable mem-
ber of the public. In this case, that can only be accom-
plished by his removal from
the system which, if he were
not removed, he would con-
tinue to represent.
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The issue of stereotypical
reasoning by judges has been an
issue in Canada for a significant
period of time. In R. v. D.D.,
[2000] 2 S.C.R. 275 (Can.), for
instance, the Supreme Court
indicated that there is “no invi-
olable rule on how people who
are the victims of trauma like a
sexual assault will behave” (at paragraph 65). In R. v. C.A.M.,
2017 MBCA 70 (Can.), the Manitoba Court of Appeal sug-
gested that “[o]ne of the unfortunate realities of the Canadian
criminal justice system historically is the prevalence of the use
by lawyers, judges and juries of myths and stereotyping to dis-
credit female and child witnesses” (at paragraph 48).7
Over the last couple of years and early this year, a number
of appeals have arisen in Canada based upon the argument that
the trial judge’s decision in a particular case was the result of
improper stereotypical thinking. Though this has primarily
involved complainants in sexual assault trials, as will be seen
it can also apply to accessing the credibility of an accused per-
son. In this column, I intend to review a number of decisions
which might be of assistance in helping judges to avoid this
mistake.8
APPELLATE CONSIDERATION
In the first decision, the trial judge made the mistake of
assuming that victims of childhood sexual abuse should
demonstrate behaviours consistent with that abuse.












In R. v. A.R.D., 2017 ABCA
237 (Can.), the accused was
charged with the offence of
sexual assault. The com-
plainant testified that “over a
number of years, when she
was between the ages of 11
and 16, the respondent
touched her sexually numer-
ous times.” The trial judge
entered an acquittal. He indi-
cated that he had a reasonable doubt based upon the com-
plainant’s evidence. In acquitting the accused, the trial judge
placed significant emphasis on the complainant’s failure to
avoid the accused after the alleged assault: 
[G]iven the length of time that these events occurred
over, and the fact that the most serious event occurred
months before [the complainant] complained, I would
have expected some evidence of avoidance either con-
scious or unconscious . . . [a]s a matter of logic and com-
mon sense, one would expect that a victim of sexual
abuse would demonstrate behaviours consistent with
that abuse or at least some change of behaviour such as
avoiding the perpetrator . . . [w]hile I recognize that
everyone does not react in the same way, the evidence
suggests that despite these alleged events, the relation-
ship between the accused and the complainant was an
otherwise normal parent/child relationship . . . [t]hat
incongruity is significant enough to leave me in doubt
about these allegations.
The Crown appealed from the entering of the acquittal. The
Alberta Court of Appeal indicated that the “appeal raises one
issue”: 
[D]id the trial judge err by relying on an impermissi-
ble stereotype, or myth, about the behaviour of sexual
assault victims in assessing the complainant’s credibility
and ultimately acquitting the accused? Specifically, that
“one would expect that a victim of sexual abuse would
demonstrate behaviours consistent with that abuse or at
least some change in behaviour such as avoiding the per-
petrator.” 
A majority of the Court of Appeal answered this question
succinctly: “The answer is clear: he did.” 
The Alberta Court of Appeal indicated that “judges must be
hypervigilant against the incursion of stereotypical analyses or
assumptions into their judicial reasoning” because “specula-
tive myths, stereotypes, and generalized assumptions about
sexual assault victims . . . have too often in the past hindered
the search for truth” (at paragraphs 49, 60). The majority of
the Court of Appeal suggested that an “accused’s right to make
full answer and defence and the criminal standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, do not allow reliance on prejudi-
cial generalizations about sexual assault victims; this is of para-
mount importance when adjudicating matters involving child
complainants” (at paragraph 6).
A majority of the Court of Appeal also held that (at para-
graph 43):
The most serious problem with the trial judge’s com-
parison-based assessment of the complainant’s credibil-
ity stems from his impermissible reliance on a myth or
stereotype (masquerading as logic and common sense)
about how a sexual assault complainant, in general and
in this case, is assumed or expected to behave post-sex-
ual assault(s). Put plainly, the trial judge’s reliance on his
own “logic and common-sense” about how humans
react following sexual assault, is itself highly question-
able as to relevance and reliability. But it becomes partic-
ularly dangerous when reliance on that “logic” over-
shadows any resort to or assessment of the actual evi-
dence at trial. The trial judge found reasonable doubt
because this particular complainant did not exhibit
expected predictive, avoidant behaviour. In our view, it is
neither logical nor a matter of common sense to expect
a child complainant to behave in any particular manner. 
A majority of the Court of Appeal concluded as follows (at
paragraphs 70 to 73):
The search for avoidant behaviour or a change of
behaviour in a sexual assault complainant, particularly a
child, is in its essence nothing more than a search for
confirmatory evidence, without which a complainant
becomes less worthy of belief. The problem with such a
search is that there is no reliable support for the pre-
sumption that a sexual assault victim will invariably,
more often than not, or even to a statistically meaningful
degree, display any predictable behaviours following the
abuse. Indeed, the converse may well be true: that a vast
proportion of child sexual abuse victims are asympto-
matic in the post-victimization period both before and
after disclosure.
An accused’s constitutionally-protected right to make
full answer and defence does not permit reliance on prej-
udicial generalizations about sexual assault victims. Rea-
sonable doubt is not a shield against appellate review if
that doubt is informed by inferences based on external,
personal assumptions or expectations about how sexual
assault victims behave either generally, or specifically.
Appellate courts must carefully scrutinize reasons to
ensure that findings said to be based on “common sense
or logic” are reliably just that, and are not, in fact, unfair
and inaccurate external viewpoints that find no founda-
tion in the record. 
For all of these reasons, the Crown has established an
error of law that is directly tied to the acquittals in this
matter. We are satisfied that the crucial credibility assess-
ment of the complainant’s testimony was not solely
based on an assessment of the evidence; instead, it was
directly affected by an impermissible stereotype, or
myth, that had a material bearing on the acquittals.
For these reasons, we allow the appeal, and direct a
new trial.
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“…it is neither 
logical nor a matter
of common sense
to expect a child
[sexual assault]
complainant to
behave in any 
particular manner.”
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THE DISSENT
In a dissenting judgment, Mr. Justice Slatter fond no stereo-
typical thinking (at paragraph 108):
In conclusion, the reasons for judgment must be read
as a whole and in context. Determining if there is a rea-
sonable doubt based on the evidence or absence of evi-
dence is the particular mandate of the trial judge. Trial
judges are entitled to rely on logic and common sense, so
long as inferences are not based on stereotypical think-
ing. This trial judge self-instructed on the need to avoid
prohibited lines of analysis. Assuming this record
engages a question of law, the Crown has not shown that
the trial judge made the asserted error, and the appeal
should be dismissed.
The accused appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. In
a brief oral argument (see 2018 SCC 6), the Supreme Court,
in dismissing the appeal, concluded that the trial judge had
erred in relying on the “expected behavior of the stereotypical
victim”:
In considering the lack of evidence of the com-
plainant’s avoidance of the appellant, the trial judge
committed the very error he had earlier in his reasons
instructed himself against: he judged the complainant’s
credibility based solely on the correspondence between
her behaviour and the expected behaviour of the stereo-
typical victim of sexual assault. This constituted an error
of law. 
The next decision illustrates the danger of accepting sub-
missions of counsel based upon myths and stereotypes.  
R. v. C.A.M. 
In C.A.M., the accused was convicted of the offence of sex-
ual assault. On appeal, the accused argued that the trial judge
erred in assessing the complainant’s evidence. The accused
argued that (at paragraph 45):
[T]he Complainant’s actions encouraging the
[Accused] to remain in the residence with her and phys-
ically comforting him after he had, as she described, vio-
lently sexually assaulted her multiple times and threat-
ened her with a knife, was not at all considered in the
analysis of the Complainant’s credibility and the plausi-
bility of her version of events. Further her continued
contact with the [Accused] in the days and months that
followed and his continued time spent alone with the
children, was not considered by the Learned Trial Judge
as a factor to consider when assessing the version of
events set forth by the Complainant. It is respectfully
submitted that a close critical look at the Complainant’s
evidence, as was applied to the [Accused’s], would have
caused these factors to be of significant concern on the
issue of credibility.  
The Manitoba Court of Appeal rejected this submission.
The Court of Appeal indicated, at paragraph 46, that the “strat-
egy of using myths and stereo-
types to discredit the credibility of
a complainant in an allegation of
sexual violence is ‘invidious’
because such a submission is sub-
tlety persuasive by its appeal to
common sense.”  
The Court of Appeal noted that
the “law is now well settled that
the use of myths and stereotypes
has no place in the determination
of credibility because such reason-
ing corrupts and distorts the trial process and may result in an
unfair trial” (at paragraph 50). The Court of Appeal also indi-
cated that (at paragraph 51):
[T]rial judges have a heavy responsibility to ensure
that counsel do not introduce the spectre of such forbid-
den reasoning into a trial. If that occurs in a jury trial, it
should be answered by a timely and appropriate instruc-
tion to the jury (see R v Barton, 2017 ABCA 216 at paras
1, 159-61). In judge-alone trials, judges must not suc-
cumb to drinking from such a poisoned chalice in their
assessment of credibility.
The Court of Appeal concluded that the accused’s submis-
sion was “unsound” (at paragraph 52 and 53):
The accused’s submission that the complainant’s cred-
ibility as to her version of events was undermined
because it did not conform to some “idealized standard
of conduct” (R v CMG, 2016 ABQB 368 at para 60) is
unsound. I reject it unequivocally. Credibility determi-
nations must be based on the totality of the evidence, not
untested assumptions of a victim’s likely behaviour
based on myths and stereotypes.
The judge properly looked at the evidence, as
opposed to myth and stereotypes, and accepted that the
complainant’s motivation for staying with the accused
after being raped on July 23, 2012, and not telling the
police, was to help him and to not further disrupt their
family situation. The fact that the complainant did not
tell the police that night about being raped was irrelevant
to assessing her credibility . . . . . The judge also accepted
the complainant’s evidence that she sincerely believed
that her children were not in danger and that, regardless
of the conflict between her and the accused, he could
continue to care for the children after the July 23, 2012
incident. There is nothing in the record to suggest other
than the accused was a good caregiver for the children;
particularly when the complainant was not around. I see
no palpable and overriding errors in the judge’s conclu-
sions as to the complainant’s credibility given the fact
that she did not sever all contact with the accused after
the July 23, 2012 incident. 
The next decision illustrates that stereotypical thinking can
also be improperly applied to the evidence of the accused. 
“[T]he law is
now well settled
that the use of
myths and
stereotypes has
no place in the
determination of
credibility.”
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The accused appealed from conviction.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.
It indicated that (at paragraph 25):
[T]he [accused’s] sexual orientation was not relevant
to the charges against him. It is settled law that with cer-
tain limited exceptions (where, for example the crime
involves deviant sexual behaviour or the accused himself
testifies to strong aversion to the sexual activity alleged,
making his own sexual tastes an issue), evidence of sex-
ual orientation is not probative of guilt and cannot be
used to draw an inference that the accused is more likely
to have committed the crime charged.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal concluded that the
trial judge permitted the accused “to be put” in an “unfair posi-
tion” and “it was unjust to judge the [accused] on the quality
of his responses” (at paragraphs 35-37):  
The reliance on the inadmissible evidence to assess
credibility in this case is problematic. The examination
of an accused on sexual orientation puts that person in
an unfair position. There may be many reasons unrelated
to guilt or innocence why a person may not wish to pub-
licly assert their sexual orientation. Those reasons may
be very strong in a small or religious community.
. . . .
Similarly, a gay man charged with sexually assaulting
a boy could properly harbour concerns that acknowl-
edging his homosexuality would be wrongly taken as an
acknowledgment of sexual attraction and could lead to
an improper inference that he is more likely to have
committed the crime charged. He could equally have
concerns that a negative answer could be viewed as
patently false. A negative answer might be viewed as an
obvious lie even, as in this case, in the absence of evi-
dence of its falsity, and as an attempt to avoid responsi-
bility. 
Finally, the most recent decision I wish to review illustrates
that the line between stereotypical thinking and assessing the
specific circumstances of a case can be a thin one and that it is
not always the prosecution suggesting we erred.  
R. v. ROBERTS
In R. v. Roberts, 2017 NWTCA 9 (Can.), the accused was
convicted of the offence of sexual assault. The evidence pre-
sented at the trial established that both the accused and the
complainant were under the influence of alcohol. The com-
plainant testified that she had gone to bed and was awoken by
the accused having sexual intercourse with her. The accused
testified that the complainant initiated multiple sexual
encounters with him, all of which were consensual. In con-
victing the accused, the trial judge stated: “On the accused’s
evidence, every aspect of the sexual encounter between the
accused and [the complainant] is instigated by [the com-
plainant]. While that is not impossible, it certainly seems
improbable.” 
The accused appealed from conviction. He argued that the
R. v. T.J.B.
In R. v. T.J.B., 2017 BCCA 49
(Can.), the accused was con-
victed of the offence of sexual
assault. The complainant was
ten years of age at the time. The
accused was twenty years of age.
During the cross-examination
of the accused, Crown counsel asked a number of questions
concerning the accused’s sexuality:
Q. So you consider yourself to be a heterosexual?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Have you ever talked with anyone about homo-
sexuality, interests in that?
A. No.
Q. Okay. How about with your friends, do you talk about
girls?
A. Oh, yeah.
Q. And I am not trying to cast aspersions or anything, but
kind of—the sort of thing like you’re out with your
friends and you see a good looking girl you’d be kind
of she looks nice, make a comment kind of thing?
A. Yeah. Actually just on break.
Q. Okay. And have you had any girlfriends?
A. I’ve had relationships that haven’t lasted long.
Q. With women?
A. Yes.
Q. With any men?
A. No.
In convicting the accused, the trial judge made use of this
evidence in concluding that the accused’s testimony was not
believable (at paragraph 23):
[W]hen asked in cross-examination if he was gay, the
accused strongly denied that he was anything other than
heterosexual. When asked if he talked about girls, he
said “Oh yeah”. He commented that he had seen a good
looking girl during a break in the trial and he would
comment on this sighting to his friends. He testified that
he has had relationships with women, but they have not
lasted very long. I found the accused highly defensive of
his sexuality. He appeared to try too hard to convince the
Court that he was heterosexual. I found his responses to
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trial judge “made a stereotypical assumption about the implau-
sibility of the complainant initiating multiple sexual encoun-
ters which materially eroded the trial’s truth-seeking function
and unfairly compromised the fairness of the trial, rendering
the appellant’s conviction unsafe” (at paragraph 51). He argued
that “in rejecting” his “evidence that the complainant had ini-
tiated the sexual contact as ‘implausible’, the trial judge
resorted to myth-based assumptions and beliefs about how a
woman would sexually engage in this situation” (at paragraph
51).
The Court of Appeal of the North West Territories suggested
that it “may fairly be said that a bulk of judicial attention has
been expended on various types of stereotypical thinking,
assumptions or generalizations identified as being unfairly
applied to sexual assault complainants” (at paragraph 47).  
The Court of Appeal held that (at paragraph 62):
[T]he trial judge did not resort to impermissible
stereotypes or assumptions about how a complainant
would engage sexually in the circumstances of this case.
There is nothing in the trial judge’s decision that hints at
such a stereotype being considered or assessed, or any
such generalized assumption being made; and the appel-
lant’s reliance on one small portion of the decision con-
cerning implausibility is no evidence of such an error,
either in its own right or when necessarily considered in
the context of the entire decision.
The Court of Appeal concluded that the conviction was
“not based on a stereotypical generalized assumption about
sexual behavior” (at paragraphs 65 and 66):
In our view, the conclusion reached by the trial judge
was not based on a stereotypical generalized assumption
about sexual behaviour, but was grounded in and arose
directly from the evidence. Her conclusions were not
impermissibly anchored in some personal worldview
unrelated to the evidence, and did not find any genesis,
or provenance, in dangerously presumptive generaliza-
tions or assumptions about the normative behaviour of a
sexual assault complainant, or this particular sexual
assault complainant.
Rather, we conclude that this finding rested upon the
totality of the evidence the trial judge did accept: that in
the factual matrix of this case, this complainant, would
not have instigated multiple sexual encounters with the
appellant. In her reasons, this finding was directly tied to
the evidence of the complainant as to her distressed state
arising from an argument with her spouse and him leav-
ing with the children, as well as the testimony of DE and
MS – both of whom confirmed the complainant was
upset a short while before the sexual encounter took
place. It was also uncontradicted that the police had
attended at the residence earlier that night on a domes-
tic dispute call. The complainant further testified that
she had gone to bed after the police left and awoke to the
appellant having sexual intercourse with her; when she
told him to get off, he punched her in the head and
threatened her. She admitted she was intoxicated
throughout.
CONCLUSION
It has been suggested that in assessing the credibility of a
witness it can be “very difficult for a trial judge to articulate
with precision the complex intermingling of impressions that
emerge after watching and listening to witnesses and attempt-
ing to reconcile the various versions of events.”9 It has also
been suggested that it “is now acknowledged that demeanour
is of limited value because it can be affected by many factors
including the culture of the witness, stereotypical attitudes,
and the artificiality of and pressures associated with a court-
room.”10
Whatever one might think of these suggestions, it is clear
that the time when it was thought that “the ideal judicial voice
would have sounded something like the voice of God” is long
past.11
It is also clear that there is no place for trial judges to assess
credibility based upon assumptions as to how a true victim of
a sexual assault should act or behave.12
Wayne Gorman is a judge of the Provincial
Court of Newfoundland and Labrador. His
blog (Keeping Up Is Hard to Do: A Trial
Judge’s Reading Blog) can be found on the web
page of the Canadian Association of Provin-
cial Court Judges. He also writes a regular
column (Of Particular Interest to Provincial
Court Judges) for the Canadian Provincial
Judges’ Journal. Judge Gorman’s work has been widely published.
Comments or suggestions to Judge Gorman may be sent to 
wgorman@provincial.court.nl.ca. 
9. R. v. Gagnon, 1 S.C.R. 621 (Can.), at paragraph 20.
10. R. v. Dyce, 2017 ONCA 123 (Can.), at paragraph 12.
11. Richard Posner, Judges Writing Styles (and do they matter?), 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1426 (1995).
12. In R. v. Richards, 2017 ONCA 424 (Can.), the issue arose as a
result of comments made in an unrelated matter. In Richards, the
trial judge in a sentencing case held just before Mr. Richard’s trial
commenced, referred to addicts as being “liars, cheaters, and
thieves, every one.” The accused argued on appeal from convic-
tion that these comments gave rise to a reasonable apprehension
of bias. In rejecting this argument, the Ontario Court of Appeal
held that (at paragraph 58):
[T]he impugned remarks, made in unrelated proceedings
after guilt had already been determined, is incapable of
demonstrating any sound basis for perceiving that any deci-
sion made at trial was grounded in prejudice, generalizations
or stereotypical reasoning. In coming to this conclusion, I in
no way condone the word choice employed by the trial judge
in the unrelated proceedings.
It was July 2008 when Steve Leben’s email floated in over theelectronic transom. The author of the annual reviews of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s past Terms was ill. A mutual friend, Phil
Frickey, suggested that I might cover the Court’s criminal law
decisions. I have no idea why Steve thought I would be suit-
able, except that Phil was a fellow Kansan, and so Phil’s judg-
ment must have been impeccable. In any event, Steve gra-
ciously extended the invitation, and I was delighted to accept.
Steve edited my reviews for ten Court Terms. I’ve not had
the good fortune to meet Steve in person, but I believe I know
him well. He is a master of the big picture and the smallest of
details. He manages to stay on top of an enormous number of
tasks. Steve has a wonderful, dry sense of humor. He’s loyal—
even to someone who is not a Kansan. And I’ve never had a
better editor: Steve combines a sharp eye with a light touch.
Along with the many readers of Court Review, I’ll miss
Steve’s guiding hand. I’m so grateful to him for his years of
service to Court Review and, especially, for the skill, patience
and kindness he has shown to me.
Chuck Weisselberg
Shannon C. Turner Professor of Law
University of California, Berkeley
Judge Steve Leben’s tenure with Court Review (20 years!)brought high quality information—via articles but also by
means of white papers, reviews, essays, and a resource page
(or two)—in highly readable prose that judges and others
could directly utilize (e.g., “Recent Decisions of the United
States Supreme Court”) or be inspired to learn more about
(e.g., “Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public Satis-
faction”). I served as Judge Steve Leben’s Co-Editor for eight
years starting in 2007. I have worked with a lot of collabora-
tors in my academic history, from co-teachers to co-reviewers
to co-editors. No one with whom I have collaborated has been
as easy or gratifying to work with. He is a clear thinker and
excellent writer, positively reflecting on a previous stint as a
journalist. He is generous with his time, seemingly always
available unless he was on the bench or writing an opinion.
He was generous with providing opportunities, not only for a
non-judge like me but also for my students and colleagues. I
had been introduced to Steve by Dr. Pam Casey from the
National Center for State Courts, who told me I would be
grateful to her for making the contact. She was right. I learned
so much about law and the judicial profession from Steve. I
am not alone, as Steve’s 2014 William H. Rehnquist Award for
Judicial Excellence (“a judge who demonstrates integrity, fair-
ness and knowledge of the law”) attests. Steve is one of the
smartest people I know, and his knowledge about so many
matters is both deep and extensive. He is a delightful person,
with a dry wit and keen insights about law and its context in
society. He is warm, and he is patient with his authors, jour-
nal production staff, and specifically this former Co-Editor!
Steve’s service will be missed. His impact on the journal will
endure. 
Professor Alan Tompkins
Co-Editor of Court Review, 2007-2015 
I had the pleasure of working with Judge Steve Leben in mytenure on the Executive Board with the AJA. I witnessed
him come up through the ranks as a new member and later
serve as President of the Organization. If that wasn’t enough,
as it is for most, Steve went on to take Court Review under his
wing and continued the tradition of a first-class publication
for a first-class organization. His tireless dedication will be
sorely missed in the future and we will never have another
one man show like him again.
Chief Judge James F. McKay III
Court of Appeal Fourth Circuit
I served as Vice President when Steve was President of AJAso in some respects, I was his "understudy." Steve, a gentle-
man and a scholar, also co-authored the white paper for AJA
on Procedural Fairness during my term as President. It was
difficult enough for me to meet the deadline of writing the
"President's Column" for the Court Review during my tenure.
I cannot imagine the time invested to oversee the execution of
such a fine periodical for 20 years! My thanks should be
added to countless others for a job well done.
Eileen A. Olds
President AJA 2007-2008
FILLING SOME BIG SHOES
A TRIBUTE TO RETIRING COURT REVIEW EDITOR JUDGE STEVE LEBEN
As noted in the final Court Review issue of 2017, Judge Steve Leben has stepped down from his co-editor 
position. Judge Leben passionately served the American Judges Association in this role for 20 years.  
Below we have gathered tributes to Judge Leben from a few of the people who have had the pleasure of 
working with him as an editor of Court Review. In addition, please see the crossword puzzle in this issue
developed by Judge Victor Fleming in honor of Judge Leben.
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Working with Steve when I was president of AJA gave mea much clearer insight into Steve's amazing contribu-
tion to the aspiration of AJA to make better judges. In further
pursuit of all things intellectual Steve's intuitively practical
and efficient mind organized the content of Court Review in
ways which make it accessible to the minds of judges and
scholars. I have come to appreciate how important his work as
Editor of Court Review has been in attracting new members—
our life's blood. Kudos to Steve for keeping the blood flowing
during his 20 years editing Court Review.
Hon. Elliott L. Zide
Retired MA Trial Court Judge, Past President of AJA
While I was a longtime fan of Court Review, I did not meetSteve until 2013. I submitted a rather sorry start to an
article on a new approach to civil case management. Steve
could see the potential and paired me with the perfect editor
to turn that raw idea into a viable article. He gave freely of his
time and talent to help me develop the concept and then see
the idea mature even beyond the article. Steve is one of those
rarest talents in today’s legal world, a gifted mentor giving of
himself to help others reach their potential. I was truly hon-
ored when Steve asked me to be one of the co-editors that will
try to follow in his footsteps. 
David Prince
District Court Judge and Co-Editor of Court Review.
In my three years working with Judge Leben on CourtReview, I was struck by how optimistic he was about the
publishing process. While I was nervously waiting on a
response to a last-minute author query or growing skeptical
that a late article was going to materialize, Judge Leben
seemed unconcerned. In his 20 years as editor, I guess he had
learned that it somehow always worked out. Or maybe more
accurately, he had learned how to make sure it always worked
out. He used his connections across the country to put
together insightful special issues, his social skills to get quick
responses from authors, his flexibility to change the contents
of an issue if necessary. Even after so many years at the editor’s
desk, Judge Leben still cared about the small details as well as
the big picture. He sought out articles on important topics
rather than simply relying on unsolicited submissions, and he
recently added two regular features (“Thoughts from Canada”
and a crossword puzzle). His confidence that we would put
out a high-quality issue each quarter made it so, and his atti-
tude and dedication made working alongside him a pleasure.
Justine Greve
Research Coordinator, Jackson County (Missouri) 
Family Court
Associate editor of Court Review, 2014-2017
I have never met Steve Leben. However, I have had a greatdeal of contact with him. Since commencing my regular col-
umn for Court Review (“Thoughts From Canada”), we have
communicated on a regular basis. It has been an absolute plea-
sure to work with Steve. He has been helpful, considerate and
encouraging. Any time I needed assistance, he provided it
immediately. 
Steve, I will miss discussing the column with you. 
Best wishes on your next project.
Judge Wayne Gorman
I had the honor and privilege of working with Steve Lebenduring my term as AJA President in 2015-2016. Steve was
quick with a gentle reminder to send the “President’s Col-
umn” to him. Over the many years Steve has been editor,
Court Review has continued to improve. We will certainly miss
his wisdom and wit in Court Review and, hopefully, will con-
tinue to benefit from his guidance as he assumes an advisory
role. We trust that Steve will remain as an active AJA Past
President and continue to add his insight and experience to
AJA’s continuing success.
Thank you, Steve, for a job well done and for your many
sacrifices on behalf of all at AJA!
Judge John Conery 
When he was looking for someone who might be willingto write an annual review of the Supreme Court’s civil
cases, Steve stumbled upon me through our mutual friend,
Gail Agrawal. I’m grateful to her for introducing me to Steve,
and I’m grateful to Steve for taking a leap of faith with me.
Any opportunity to try to be of service to the AJA is an oppor-
tunity worth taking, but having the chance to undertake that
work with someone of Steve’s intellect and sensibilities has
been beyond wonderful. I join countless others in wishing
him many happy and productive years ahead. 
Todd Pettys
H. Blair and Joan V. White Chair in Civil Litigation
University of Iowa College of Law
As AJA’s Association Manager, I have worked with Steveduring his entire tenure as Editor. Steve’s dedication to
producing a journal of which AJA can be extremely proud is
inspiring. Court Review is a fitting product for “The Voice of
the Judiciary™” thanks to Steve’s many years of hard work!
Shelley Rockwell
AJA Association Manager
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Getting to work as Steve’s co-editor of Court Review hasbeen a highlight of my career. As a law-psychology pro-
fessor, I often do research or read other people’s research wish-
ing it could get into the hands of judges. Steve empowered me
to do just that and along the way gave me insights into what
judges wanted to know. I will also never forget the swiftness
of his email responses. I would just barely be through the
email from an author’s submission of an article and Steve
would be emailing me with his detailed and thoughtful
responses about the article submission. It was clear on multi-
ple occasions that he was some sort of time wizard! 
Eve Brank
Co-editor of Court Review, 2015- present 
I first met Steve when I was the law clinic director at Wash-burn Law School and he was a trial court judge in suburban
Kansas City way back in 1996. Steve and I served on various
panels together at different CLEs for the Kansas Bar Associa-
tion and we instantly developed a professional collaborative
connection around research, writing, and teaching. We edited
one another’s work, and challenged each other’s assumptions
before live (if captive) CLE audiences. When Steve became
the editor of Court Review two decades ago, he invited me to
serve on the board of editors. He told me it was his vision to
raise the publication to a “must read” for judges in the US and
Canada. And so he did, with grace and good humor. Soon
after that invitation to advise him as a member of the board,
he had charmed me into writing articles and ultimately edit-
ing more than one specialty issue on domestic violence. When
I moved to Colorado and later became a judge myself, I con-
tinued to turn to Steve for his insightful guidance and exper-
tise on the academic side of the law. I am proud to say that for
over 22 years Steve has been a mentor and a friend. As one of
the four individuals who will struggle to fill his legacy of
excellence with Court Review, I can tell you that he will be
missed but never far from our work.  Thank you, Steve. I hope
we make you proud.




20 years working with Steve has given me an appreciationfor his meticulous attention to language and the art of
writing. As a graphic designer I focus on visual communica-
tion, the readability of text and graphics, but Steve’s command
of the word and the nuances of punctuation and grammar
gave me insights into the importance of communicating
meaning, especially to an audience of judges who’s interpreta-
tion of language has such a great impact on our society.
Thanks for two decades of dedication to Court Review, Steve
… and no, even you can’t edit time!
Gratitude and best wishes for your future endeavors.
Mike Fairchild
“Our layout guy,” m-Design Studio
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THANK YOU, JUDGE LEBEN!
“Be a good editor. The Universe needs more good editors, God knows.” 
— Kurt Vonnegut
After hundreds of articles and many, many thousands of words, Judge Steve Leben is retiring as
the Editor of Court Review.
A heartfelt “thank you” to Judge Leben for his steadfast stewardship of Court Review for the past
two decades. Twenty years ago, Judge Leben envisioned changing Court Review into an important
“must-read” journal for judges in the U.S. and Canada. He accomplished that goal and we are all
the better for it. Thank you, Judge Leben, for sharing your editorial gifts and insights with so
many of us over so many years.
We will miss your humor, passion, and light, yet thoughtful, editorial touch. 
Put away your Blue Book and enjoy your free time!
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LOOKING BACKWARD
The “war on drugs” in the 1980s led to more punitive drug-
related legislation and exponential increases in arrest and
incarceration rates. In 1980, there were 580,900 drug violation
arrests. In 1989, the number of drug-related arrests increased
to more than 1.3 million.1 The substantial increase in arrests,
many which were nonviolent, overburdened courts and
resulted in increasingly overcrowded prisons. Laypersons and
legal actors became frustrated with the traditional approach to
case processing and the “revolving door” of repeat drug-related
offenders.2 In response to burgeoning dockets and prisons and
drug-related recidivism, Miami-Dade County, Florida opened
the country’s first drug court in 1989.   
THE DRUG COURT MODEL 
Miami-Dade County’s Drug Court integrated substance use
treatment and legal sanctions to divert defendants out of
prison and expedite case processes. To this end, the Miami-
Dade County Drug Court targeted non-serious (e.g., posses-
sion), non-violent felony drug offenders and charged judges
with long-term treatment adherence oversight.3, 4 Judges held
frequent hearings with participants and closely monitored
their rehabilitation progress. If participants successfully com-
pleted (graduated) the program (e.g., series of negative drug
test results, no additional arrests), they could have their
charges reduced or case dismissed. If participants failed to
comply, they faced a variety of sanctions, including incarcera-
tion.5 Participation was voluntary such that arrestees could
plead guilty and choose to participate in the program, or they
could choose the standard legal proceedings (e.g., plea bar-
gaining or trial).6
Miami-Dade County’s Drug Court was considered an inno-
vative alternative to incarceration and the “business as usual”
criminal justice approach to drug-related crime. The Drug
Court was lauded for its collaborative efforts with drug treat-
ment and social service agencies, and its emphasis on address-
ing underlying problems associated with criminal activity.
Despite this, some considered this early attempt to lack coher-
ence and coordination.7 Nevertheless, the Miami-Dade County
Drug Court served as an exemplar for all future Drug Court
models.
Evolving Drug Courts incorporated additional services,
such as job placement, public health, education and vocational
training.8 Some jurisdictions also shifted their focus from less
serious to more serious offenders.9 The Drug Court model is
now defined by 10 Key Components, which jurisdictions must
comply with to receive federal funding.10 Currently, there are
over 1,300 drug courts in operation in the U.S.11 Although
drug courts have evolved, it was the early or “first generation”
models that facilitated a more “therapeutic” approach to crime
and the advent of numerous distinctive problem-solving
courts. 
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 
Although the Miami-Dade County Drug Court was not
specifically modeled within a therapeutic jurisprudence frame-
work, the court’s approach exemplified therapeutic jurispru-
dence principles.12 Therapeutic jurisprudence is concerned
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with the degree to which legal systems and actors yield thera-
peutic outcomes for criminal justice participants.13 The goal of
therapeutic jurisprudence is to enable practitioners to enhance
aspects of the law to be more therapeutic while comporting
with other justice principles, such as due process.14 Hence, a
court program that incorporates therapeutic outcomes for its
participants can be considered an example of therapeutic
jurisprudence.15 Judges who visited Miami-Dade County’s first
drug court soon implemented similar models within their own
jurisdictions, and so began the rise of problem-solving
courts.16
SPECIALTY COURTS
Specialty courts, also called problem-solving courts, seek to
address social issues that facilitate criminal behavior and
involvement. Although there is no one definition that encom-
passes all specialty courts, most specialty courts share some
common elements. Specialty courts aim to reduce recidivism;
produce better outcomes for clients; modify legal responses to
crime; reform governmental and legal approaches to crime;
incorporate mostly constant (and long-term) judicial monitor-
ing; collaborate with outside agencies to achieve their goals;
and promote a less adversarial courtroom dynamic.17 Generally
speaking, specialty courts are known for their collaborative
team approach to address recurring crimes and underlying
problems facilitating criminal justice involvement. 
Inspired by American models, specialty courts have also
been established internationally. Iterations of American Drug
Courts and Community Courts are operational in England, Ire-
land, Scotland, Canada, and Australia18 and a multitude of
other countries.19, 20 There are Domestic Violence Courts in
Australia, Scotland, England, and Canada. Australia and
Canada also both have Mental Health Courts as well as Abo-
riginal Courts.21 Australia has also opened DUI/DWI, Home-
less, and Prostitution courts.22, 23
Specialty courts were named as such due to their “special-
ization” or focus of a target population or problem. However,
as will be demonstrated, contemporary “hybrid” courts can
address a variety of problems. As drug courts proliferated
across jurisdictions, specialty court proponents expanded the
problem-solving approach to
other populations and problems.  
EVOLUTION
Specialty courts have
expanded both in number and
variation.24 Most specialty court
models utilize a team of attor-
neys, treatment or social service
professionals, and trained court staff; engage in frequent mon-
itoring and judicial supervision; and use a graduated system
of incentives and sanctions. Some specialty courts focus on
individualized justice and others seek to benefit entire com-
munities. Some specialty courts place greater import on mon-
itoring and compliance, and others are more concerned with
rehabilitation.25 Next is a brief review of common specialty
court programs.   
MENTAL HEALTH COURTS 
In 2000, Congress enacted America’s Law Enforcement and
Mental Health Project, which funded the development and
expansion of Mental Health Courts (MHCs).26 Like Drug
Courts, MHCs promote recovery and reduce recidivism.27
MHCs vary across jurisdictions but share some common ele-
ments. Potential clients are identified through mental health
assessments and participation is voluntary. MHC teams (e.g.,
court actors, mental health professionals) develop a judicially
supervised treatment strategy and employ a variety of incen-
tives and sanctions.28 The first generation of MHC targeted
nonviolent offenders charged with misdemeanors. Second
generation MHCs are more likely to accept individuals
charged with felonies and thus, are more likely to require a
guilty plea and use jail as a sanction.29 Research on MHCs sug-
gests that participation is positively associated with reduced
recidivism, however, definitive conclusions are hampered by
methodologically weak studies.30 As of 2012, there were over
300 MHCs.31
DRUG COURTS 
Most first-generation Drug Court models focused on less-
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serious offenders and pretrial
diversion. In this model, partic-
ipants who successfully com-
pleted the program would have
their charges dismissed (pre-
plea dispositional model).32 As
Drug Courts evolved, participa-
tion allowed for higher-level
offenders who had to enter a
guilty plea prior to participa-
tion (post-plea model). In some
models, a participant who
pleads guilty can have the con-
viction vacated (post-plea/pre-adjudication) or reduce or
avoid incarceration or probation (post-adjudication).33
Research on Drug Courts indicates that the Drug Court model
works best with strict adherence to 10 Key Components and
with a high-risk population.34 Drug Court participation has
been associated with a 12% reduction in recidivism.35 Other
specialty court programs have also incorporated the Drug
Court model. 
DUI/DWI COURTS
The first court to specialize in DUI/DWI began in New Mex-
ico in 1995.36 Like Drug Courts, DWI/DUI Courts address the
root causes of driving under the influence, such as alcohol
addiction.37 Some DUI/DWI courts target only DUI/DWI
arrestees and others accept those with related misdemeanor
charges. Research on DUI/DWI courts suggests similar results
to Drug Courts except results for DUI/DWI courts were not
definitive across all rigorous, randomized assessments.38
REENTRY COURTS
Reentry Courts are designed to address problems that might
be experienced by parolees transitioning from incarceration to
community release. Reentry Drug Courts target transitioning
offenders with a history of substance abuse.39 Some Reentry
Courts accept participants who pose a high risk to public
safety, and some accept ex-offenders who are likely to return to
jail or prison, typically “low-level drug offenders and the men-
tally ill.”40 Eligibility criteria can vary substantially across
jurisdictions. Some Reentry Court clients also receive voca-
tional and housing assistance. Participants who graduate from
a Reentry Court program can receive early discharge from
supervision.41 Research on Reentry Courts indicates that
clients were less likely to be rearrested for misdemeanor and
drug charges and less likely to be reconvicted. However, par-
ticipants were also more likely to have parole revoked for tech-
nical violations, likely due to enhanced supervision/monitor-
ing.42 Evaluation of California Collaborative Reentry Courts
suggested that participants are more likely to be rearrested but
less likely to have parole revoked.43
VETERANS COURTS  
In response to the growing number of veterans appearing in
court for substance abuse and/or mental health issues, juris-
dictions institutionalized Veterans Courts. The Veteran Treat-
ment Court in Buffalo, opened in 2008, typically accepts non-
violent offenders diagnosed with serious mental health ill-
ness(es) or substance dependency, making a hybrid of Mental
Health and Drug Court models.44 The court also employs peer-
to-peer mentoring.45 Veterans Courts work closely with a mul-
titude of veteran’s organizations and provide a variety of
resources other than treatment, including financial assistance,
housing, and employment training.46 We could not locate eval-
uations of Veteran Treatment Courts. In 2014, there were 220
Veterans Courts.47
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS  
Domestic Violence Courts (DVCs) were facilitated by the
Violence Against Women Act, which sought to empower
domestic violence victims and hold domestic violence perpe-
trators more accountable.48 Brooklyn, New York established
one of the early DVCs in 1996. The “Brooklyn Model” pro-
vided resources for victims (e.g., victim advocacy, job training,
counseling, housing) and closely monitored defendants to
ensure court order compliance. Considering the focus on vic-
tim safety, monitoring is perhaps more crucial for DVCs than
other types of problem-solving courts.49 Some DVCs focus
solely on civil restraining orders, and others adjudicate crimi-
32. HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 10, at 24.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 14, 17.
35. Ojmarrh Mitchell et al., Assessing the Effectiveness of Drug Courts
on Recidivism: A Meta-Analytic Review of Traditional and Non-Tra-
ditional Drug Courts, 40 J. CRIM. JUST. 60, 64 (2012). 
36. Scott M. Ronan et al., The Effectiveness of Idaho DUI and Misde-
meanor/DUI Courts: Outcome Evaluation, 48 J. OFFENDER REHAB.
154, 154 (2009).
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SOLVING COURT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES VOLUME II, NUM-
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40. ROBERT V. WOLF, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, REENTRY COURTS: LOOK-
ING AHEAD: A CONVERSATION ABOUT STRATEGIES FOR OFFENDER REIN-
TEGRATION 5-6 (2011).
41. Id. at 3.
42. ZACHARY HAMILTON ET AL., CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, DO REENTRY
COURTS REDUCE RECIDIVISM?: RESULTS FROM THE HARLEM PAROLE
REENTRY COURT (2010).
43. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., A PRELIMINARY
LOOK AT CALIFORNIA PAROLEE REENTRY COURTS (2009), available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/AOCBriefParolee0612.pdf.
44. HON. ROBERT T. RUSSELL, VETERANS TREATMENT COURTS DEVELOPING
THROUGHOUT THE NATION 3 (2009).
45. Id. at 131.
46. Id.
47. History, JUST. FOR VETS, https://justiceforvets.org/vtc-history (last
visited Dec. 22, 2016).
48. Allison Cleveland, Specialization Has the Potential to Lead to
Uneven Justice: Domestic Violence Cases in the Juvenile & Domestic
Violence Courts, 6 MOD. AM. 17 (2010).
49. Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of
a Shifting Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1621 (2012).









Court Review - Volume 54 17
nal, divorce, and custody cases.50 There are also hybrid Domes-
tic Violence/Mental Health Courts.51 Research on DVCs shows
mixed results for recidivism; however, a focus on deterrence,
accountability, monitoring, and victim safety promotes better
recidivism-related outcomes. Moreover, DVC participation
positively associated with conviction and incarceration for
male defendants.52 There are approximately 300 DVCs in the
U.S.53
COMMUNITY COURTS  
Community Courts are “neighborhood-focused” courts that
incorporate collaborative problem-solving principles to address
issues in the local community.54 The Midtown Community
Court in New York opened in 1993 to address “quality-of-life”
crimes (e.g., disorderly conduct, graffiti, shoplifting, public
intoxication, prostitution, and minor drug possession).55, 56 The
Red Hook Community Justice Center in New York, which
opened in 2000, also handles low-level crimes, including land-
lord and tenant disputes and juvenile delinquency cases.57
Some Community Courts also focus on mental health.58 The
most common services offered or mandated by Community
Courts include treatment readiness classes, individual counsel-
ing, job skills, anger management, and substance abuse treat-
ment.59 Community Courts are especially focused on commu-
nity engagement and impact.60 An evaluation of the Red Hook
Community Justice Center suggests an estimated taxpayer sav-
ing of $4,756 per defendant and 10% reduction in adult recidi-
vism.61 As of 2008, there were almost 40 domestic and 33 inter-
national Community Courts in existence.62
HOMELESS COURTS 
The first Homeless Court originated in San Diego, Califor-
nia in 1989.63 The purpose of the court is to resolve outstand-
ing misdemeanor citations by offering progressive plea bar-
gaining and alternative sentencing (e.g., participation in lieu of
custody). Clients, many of whom are veterans, participate in
mental health treatment, voca-
tional training, life-skills educa-
tion, and substance use treat-
ment.64 Twenty-five jurisdictions
currently operate at least one
Homeless Court (or specialized
court session).65
FATHERING COURTS 
The nation’s first Fathering
Court originated in Jackson County, Missouri in 1997. The tar-
get population included individuals ordered to appear in court
for child support non-payment. As such, the program pro-
moted “participation as an alternative to incarceration.”66
Other Fathering Courts have since opened in other states, and
many states have noncourt-based problem-solving programs
(e.g., Texas and Alabama).67 The District of Columbia opened
the first hybrid Fathering Reentry Court, which focuses on
child support cases that include a noncustodial parent transi-
tioning out of incarceration.68, 69 Fathering and Fathering
Reentry courts place considerable emphasis on employment
services, vocational training, and education programs, which
can be essential for reentry and noncustodial parent popula-
tions.70, 71 Fathering Court (designated and hybrid) programs
can also include curriculum to engage noncustodial parents in
responsible co-parenting (e.g., parental engagement, money-
management) in addition to substance-use and mental-health
treatment options.72 Few evaluations have been conducted of
Fathering Courts. Initial assessments indicate an overall
improvement in child-support payments.73
ANIMAL COURTS 
Animal Courts were established in response to the low pri-
ority that animal cruelty cases receive in the criminal justice
system and to prevent and reduce animal abuse and neglect.74
There are currently three animal courts in the U.S.75 The first,
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51. NOLAN, supra note 18.
52. AMANDA B. CISSNER ET AL., CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, TESTING THE
EFFECTS OF NEW YORK’S DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS (2013), avail-
able at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/242583.pdf.
53. WOLF, supra note 25, at 15.
54. Karafin, supra note 20.
55. CYNTHIA G. LEE, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, A COMMUNITY
COURT GROWS IN BROOKLYN: A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION OF THE
RED HOOK COMMUNITY JUSTICE CENTER (2013).
56. MICHELE SVIRIDOFF ET AL., CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, DISPENSING JUS-
TICE LOCALLY: THE IMPACTS, COSTS, AND BENEFITS OF THE MIDTOWN
COMMUNITY COURT (2002).
57. LEE ET AL., supra note 55.
58. NOLAN, supra note 18.
59. Karafin, supra note 20, at 9.
60. LEE ET AL., supra note 55.
61. Id.
62. Karafin, supra note 20.
63. Steve Binder & Amy Horton-Newell, Returning Home to Homeless-
ness; San Diego’s Homeless Court Program Models Ways to Help, 23
EXPERIENCE 34, 35 (2014).
64. Homeless Courts, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
public_services/homelessness_poverty/initiatives/homeless_court
s.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
65. Id.
66. JANE MACOUBRIE & DANIEL J. HALL, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
ACHIEVING THE FULL POTENTIAL OF REENTRY AND FATHERS’ COURTS 5
(2010).
67. Id. at 3-4.
68. Id. at 4. 
69. Hon. Milton C. Lee, Fatherhood in the Child Support System, 50
FAM. CT. REV. 59, 63 (2012).
70. Id. at 63-64.
71. MACOUBRIE & HALL, supra note 66, at 2-3.
72. Lee, supra note 69, at 65.
73. MACOUBRIE & HALL, supra note 66, at 20; see also for recom-
mended best practices. 
74. Terrill E. Pierce, New Mexico’s First Animal Welfare Court Starts
This Spring, ST. B. N.M. (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.nmbar.org/
nmbardocs/aboutus/sections/animallaw/AnimalWelfareCourt.pdf. 
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called Animal Welfare Court, was
established in Tucson (Pima
County), Arizona in 2012 and
handles misdemeanor cases
involving animals.76 Clients
might be mandated to complete
intervention and/or treatment
programs and might be fined, or
receive jail or probation.77 The
Pre-Adjudication Animal Welfare
Court (PAW) was established in
New Mexico in May 2016.78 This
program convenes once a week
and also hears animal-involved
misdemeanor cases; but in this court, participants are able to
have their charges dismissed if they complete a 16-week inter-
vention.79 Both courts offer some judicial oversight. In 2016,
Botetourt County, Virginia opened an Animal Court to address
animal neglect and cruelty cases once a quarter, but there is cur-
rently no judicial supervision or intervention.80
It is beyond the scope of this article to review every varia-
tion of problem-solving court. Suffice it to say that there are
many, including Elder Courts, Prostitution/Human Trafficking
Courts, Family Dependency Courts, Tribal Wellness Courts,
Gambling Courts, Truancy Courts, Juvenile Drug Courts, Peer
Courts, Gun Courts, and a variety of federal specialty courts.
Different specialty courts have different emphases and differ-
ent outcome considerations. However, many share common
advantages and disadvantages, and most are still in need of
rigorous evaluation. 
PRESENT DAY
The number of specialty courts throughout the United
States continues to increase.81 Specialty courts have shifted the
focus from punishment to rehabilitation and prevention,
which could be associated with several advantages and disad-
vantages. Furthermore, specialty courts need to demonstrate
their true worth. Conducting methodologically weak evalua-
tions might hinder a court’s ability to do just that. For exam-
ple, a meta-analysis of MHCs indicated that methodologically
stronger assessments showed reductions in recidivism but
weaker evaluations did not.82 Finally, taking potential advan-
tages and disadvantages of specialty courts into account can
also improve the quality of evaluations. 
ADVANTAGES OF SPECIALTY COURTS
There are a number of advantages associated with specialty
courts. First, specialty court judges are experts in specific
areas (e.g., drugs, domestic violence). This expertise might
result in more therapeutic outcomes for offenders because the
judge has a better understanding of both the laws related to
that area and of the challenges that offenders face (e.g., addic-
tion).83 Second, specialty courts might reduce recidivism by
treating underlying social and psychological issues that con-
tribute to criminal behavior. Third, addressing psychological
and social problems is also good for offenders’ well-being,
offenders’ families, and the community, as addressing these
problems might result in increased employment rates and
decreases in other social problems (e.g., homelessness).
Fourth, reduced recidivism, as a result of treating underlying
problems, can also help reduce prison overcrowding and judi-
cial caseloads.84 Fifth, reductions in recidivism rates might
decrease costs over time.85 Finally, specialty court judges
might experience greater job satisfaction and less burnout.86
In sum, there are many potential advantages to specialty
courts, including benefits to offenders, judges, the courts, and
communities.    
DISADVANTAGES OF SPECIALTY COURTS
Although potential advantages of specialty courts make
developing and maintaining specialty courts appealing, possi-
ble disadvantages also must be considered. First, specialty
courts do not follow an adversarial model and, thus, certain
protections afforded to defendants, such as due-process rights
and the right to legal representation, might not be main-
tained.87 Second, participation in specialty courts might result
in harsher punishments than offenders would have received in
traditional courts.88, 89 Third, offenders are often told that their
cases will be dismissed upon successful completion of spe-
cialty-court-mandated requirements. A choice between sen-
tencing in traditional courts or treatment and dropped charges
in specialty courts can be perceived as coercive.90, 91 Fourth,
there is also the possibility that judges will experience
increased burnout and vicarious trauma.92 Specialty court
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judges hear the same types of cases and interact with similar
offenders repeatedly, which could result in burnout.93 More-
over, presiding over certain topics, like domestic violence,
might result in judges experiencing vicarious trauma.94 Finally,
specialty courts might be costly (e.g., start-up costs, client ser-
vices, staff and judicial training). The advantages and disad-
vantages associated with specialty courts should be considered
in specialty court evaluations. 
EVALUATION 
According to Wolf,95 there are six principles of problem-
solving justice that specialty courts must adhere to to be effec-
tive: (1) enhanced information, (2) community engagement,
(3) collaboration, (4) individualized justice, (5) accountability,
and (6) outcomes (data collection and analysis). Ongoing data
collection and assessment is especially important to improve
future specialty courts and to increase the odds of sustainabil-
ity. However, many evaluations focus only on some outcomes
(e.g., recidivism, treatment adherence) and other considera-
tions, like community engagement, might not be assessed at all
or are poorly assessed.96
To make informed decisions about whether specialty courts
should be maintained, expanded, or discontinued, evaluations
of specialty courts are necessary. Generally, evaluations and
anecdotal evidence from various types of specialty courts (e.g.,
juvenile courts, drug courts, mental health courts) suggest
that specialty courts are effective and successful.97 However,
many evaluations measure “effectiveness” as short-term
recidivism rates and do not measure other outcomes (e.g.,
judicial satisfaction, positive outcomes for families and the
community). Success is difficult to define in the context of
specialty courts. Success for the courts might mean reduced
costs, reduced caseloads, and reduced crowding in prisons.
Success for the community might mean a decrease in social
issues such as homelessness. Success for offenders and their
families might mean gaining employment, not using drugs,
and keeping families together. Thus, many outcomes should
be considered when conducting evaluations to determine if
specialty courts are effective and worthwhile to implement
and maintain.  
Additionally, many evaluations do not use methodically rig-
orous research methods; thus, the results should be interpreted
with caution. Many evaluations do not use an adequate control
group98 when comparing outcomes from specialty courts and
traditional courts.99 If offenders
who participate in specialty
courts differ significantly from a
comparison group of offenders
in traditional courts, the results
might not be reliable. Ideally,
experiments100 would be con-
ducted in which offenders
would be randomly assigned to
either a specialty court or a tra-
ditional court and outcomes
between groups are compared.
However, random assignment is
not always possible because of ethical concerns. If random
assignment is not possible, the two groups should be compared
before going through the court process (specialty court or tra-
ditional court) to determine the extent to which the two groups
differ. More evaluations that use methodically rigorous research
methods are necessary to determine if specialty courts should
be implemented and maintained. 
LOOKING FORWARD
The expansion and evolution of specialty courts reflects a
transformation in the ways in which the criminal justice sys-
tem approaches and responds to crime. Specialty courts might
also shape and be shaped by the criminal justice system in the
future. Problem-solving court programs might be taken to
scale, whereby specialty court programs are applied to main-
stream courts. In contrast, specialty court programs might be
diluted and integrated with more conventional methods. Spe-
cialty court programs might also inspire states to place greater
emphasis on diversion and decriminalizing legislation (e.g.,
marijuana use and possession). Problem-solving courts might
also continue to develop across jurisdictions. 
FUTURE TRENDS
The continued proliferation of problem-solving courts is
perhaps an indicator that a problem-solving approach is per-
ceived to be, at the very least, better than traditional
approaches. After several decades, problem-solving programs
are likely no longer considered tentative demonstration pro-
jects. The challenge then is to determine whether courts
should continue to specialize in certain populations or crimes,
whether problem-solving principles should be applied on a
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larger scale, or whether states
should consider increased diver-
sionary tactics. 
GOING TO SCALE
Specialty courts could be con-
sidered an improvement from the
traditional adversarial system of
criminal justice. However, even
the most successful specialty
courts are effective only on a
small scale.101 Thus, effectively
addressing a larger population
might pose unique challenges.
For example, some courts work
best with a specific population.102
Moreover, some specialty court variants have not established
evidence-based “best practices.” Scaling up ineffective por-
tions of a program might hinder progress and add unnecessary
costs. Hence, a broader specialty court program application
might be challenging, infeasible, or ineffectual. New York has
taken Drug Courts to scale by implementing Drug Courts in
every county.103 In California, problem-solving courts are
referred to as Collaborative Justice Courts and, like New York,
California has expanded the use of problem-solving courts
statewide.104 California’s court planners have also continu-
ously investigated ways in which to disseminate problem-
solving practices into mainstream courts.105 Future evalua-
tions should be conducted to document challenges and tri-
umphs associated with going-to-scale projects. It is also pos-
sible that specialty court programs will be modified for a
broader application.  
INTEGRATING CONVENTIONAL COURT PRACTICES
As of 2008, there were at least 1,600 counties that did not
have a Drug Court.106 According to surveyed judges, the top rea-
sons for limited Drug Court capacity are insufficient funding
(state and federal) and limited treatment availability.107 Conse-
quently, Drug Courts and other specialty courts might not be
viable in all jurisdictions. To circumvent these limitations, some
jurisdictions might modify problem-solving models to integrate
them with mainstream court practices. However, this tactic
should be approached cautiously for several reasons. First,
research on Drug Courts has shown that “watered-down” ver-
sions are not as effective as those that strictly adhere to the 10
Key Components.108 Second, a lack of rigorous and method-
ologically sound research makes it difficult to identify those
components of a model that might be crucial for success.109
Lacking this information might lead to poor integration decision
making. Therefore, modification and integration might reduce
benefits associated with some problem-solving court models. 
INCREASED DIVERSION
Specialty courts, including Drug Courts, are not without
their critics. Some opponents believe that Drug Courts facili-
tate a more punitive approach to addiction. Participants who
relapse are penalized, and some might be incarcerated for a
longer period of time than if they had gone the more conven-
tional route.110 The goal of the Drug Policy Alliance is to facil-
itate a more health-oriented response to drug use and elimi-
nate incarceration altogether for petty drug use.111 Over the
last decade, several states have shifted to legislation that
decriminalizes small-scale marijuana use. Considering this
shift in community sentiment, decriminalization and pre-plea
diversion methods might be realistic approaches in the future.  
ESTABLISHING OR MAINTAINING A SPECIALTY COURT 
Judges and court administrators planning for the future
might consider establishing a problem-solving court or deter-
mining whether a preexisting problem-solving court should be
maintained or modified. Whether or not a problem-solving
court should be established or maintained can be determined
with a needs assessment and a cost-benefit analysis, which pro-
vide judges with information to determine whether there is a
demand for a specialty court and whether the problem-solving
court program is cost-effective. Finally, if judges decide to
adopt a specialty court internationally (and locally), they
might face several challenges. 
NEEDS ASSESSMENT
When considering whether to adopt a specialty court,
judges and court administrators should first conduct an assess-
ment to determine whether such a court is necessary. While
anecdotal evidence and personal experience are useful, scien-
tific “needs assessments” allow for thorough, unbiased assess-
ment. Jurisdictions could hire professors and graduate stu-
dents from local colleges, a research firm, or an intern to con-
duct the assessment. Alternately, a judge or court employee
could learn to do the assessment. While professional assess-
ments are ideal, informal assessments can be conducted simply
and inexpensively. The Appendix contains some resources that
describe needs assessments in more detail.
WHAT IS A NEEDS ASSESSMENT?
A needs assessment identifies problems and then suggests
how to improve or develop programs, services, or infrastruc-
ture to address these problems.112 The assessment uses estab-
lished research methodologies to answer the questions “is












113. Id. 114. See generally Barry Williams, Cost-Benefit Analysis, 2 ECON. &
LABOUR MARKET REV. 67 (2008).
there a problem?” and “is there a need for this service/pro-
gram to address the problem?” The assessment determines the
likely costs to the community and the legal system if the prob-
lem is addressed or if the problem remains unaddressed. For
instance, will the number of people experiencing drug prob-
lems increase if there are no specialty drug courts? Will prison
populations be reduced if drug courts are adopted? The
assessment will determine whether the community will be
able to meet the needs of this population. For instance, the
assessment can determine whether the community has the
psychological resources to have a mental health court. Finally,
an assessment weighs the competing needs of the community.
Any community has many needs at any given time, and thus
is a specialty court one of the most pressing needs that
demands urgent attention? An assessment can help determine
the community’s priorities and possible solutions; it then
helps determine how best to allocate resources such as money
and people.
HOW IS A NEEDS ASSESSMENT CONDUCTED?
Data acquired during a needs assessment can come from
many sources.113 Interviews, focus groups, and community
meetings are common, and these methods typically involve
open-ended questions, which provide in-depth answers. Data
can also be acquired through mail, online, or in-person sur-
veys. Surveys allow researchers to ask more questions and have
more participants compared to the other techniques, but gen-
erally produce more shallow answers. Researchers can use
these techniques to acquire information from the population to
be addressed by the court. For instance, a researcher could ask
veterans for their perceptions about factors (e.g., brain trauma,
Post-Traumatic Stress, employment problems) that contribute
to them committing crime. Researchers can ask defendants in
the traditional court system if they would participate in a spe-
cialty court program if it existed. Researchers can also use
these techniques to acquire information from the community
and stakeholders (e.g., policymakers, service providers,
judges). 
A needs assessment can include interviews with key infor-
mants. Because some populations (e.g., homeless or prosti-
tutes) are hard to find and study, often researchers interview
those with the most knowledge about this group, such as ther-
apists, advocates, or volunteers.  For instance, advocates for
victims of sex trafficking would be well-suited to know how
many victims there are in the community and if this number
has increased; they would know the needs of this group and
whether the courts are the proper avenue to address these
needs. Informants would also know whether the community
has resources the courts could use or whether the courts would
have to develop their own resources. Informants would also
understand the minimum resources that would be needed to
help people who often have numerous, intertwined problems.
For instance, prostitutes are often abused, addicted, and emo-
tionally attached to their handlers. They often have little or no
education, housing, money man-
agement skills, family or social
support, employment history, or
adequate clothing. Informants
would know what would be
required to address all these
problems. 
Needs assessments often rely
on secondary data that is regu-
larly collected by the criminal
justice system or other entities.
Anecdotes and opinions are use-
ful, but tend to be speculative and not representative of the
complete scope of the problem. Data from court records can
determine the quantity of repeat offenders and whether a pro-
portion of a certain group (e.g., veterans) in prison exceeds the
proportion of the general population that is not incarcerated.  
Even if the assessment is done informally, the results can
still help researchers and courts determine how to use this
information. It is likely that a community has a number of
related needs—and that any population will have many needs.
The assessment can determine which needs are the most criti-
cal, addressable, and cost-effective. The costs and benefits of
programs (including specialty courts) can prompt another type
of assessment: a cost-benefit analysis. 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The future of any program can be highly dependent on pro-
gram sustainability. An important consideration in determining
whether to develop or maintain specialty courts is how the
monetary costs will be defrayed. Thus, an economic assessment
is essential in planning for future courts. Specialty courts can be
funded through taxes, government grants, and/or fines paid by
defendants who use the courts. There are other costs, too, such
as the extra caseload of offenders seeking mental health ser-
vices, which can overburden mental health service providers.
Additionally, courts must consider the benefits of such courts.
Specialty courts can benefit the defendants, the legal system,
and society in general. They can ultimately save money, if they
have outcomes such as preventing recidivism, promoting good
health, and educating offenders. Such weighing of costs and
benefits is aptly called a cost-benefit analysis (CBA). As
described above with regard to needs assessments, such analy-
ses do not have to be expensive, and can be conducted by a
hired researcher or someone employed by the court. They are
somewhat more complicated, however, and often do demand
help from professionals. The Appendix contains some resources
that describe needs assessments in more detail.
WHAT IS A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS? A CBA identifies
all the costs (e.g., money, time) and benefits (e.g., reduction in
recidivism or number of prisoners) to establish whether a pro-
gram produces a net gain to society.114 If the benefits outweigh
the costs, then generally the program or policy is worth-
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while.115 CBAs are routine in
crime policy analysis,116
although there are many varia-
tions of CBAs that range from
very broad to very narrow and
from very technical to very gen-
eral.117 Jurisdictions that are
considering whether to adopt or
continue with specialty courts
should conduct a CBA.118 Con-
siderations should be given to all stakeholders, which could
include the defendants, the court system, the prison system,
probation and parole systems, the service providers in the
community, and society as a whole. 
HOW IS A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CONDUCTED? A
CBA is designed to inform decision makers (e.g., policymak-
ers) as to the best course of action by calculating the relative
costs and benefits to all stakeholders. The list provided above
is only a partial list of potential costs and benefits that would
have to be assessed. Often these are monetary expenses (e.g.,
the cost to incarcerate a prisoner), but often the costs or bene-
fits cannot easily be quantified.119 For instance, how does one
put a dollar value on a reduction in crime or on having one
fewer person addicted to drugs? Dominguez and Raphael120
review a variety of ways to estimate the dollar value of the cost
of crime to society; other non-monetary costs would also have
to be quantified as well.  
Some CBAs focus on a specific cost, for instance, the costs
of putting children in foster care due to the parent’s offend-
ing,121 while others focus on a variety of costs and benefits
(e.g., increased earnings and ability to pay child support; men-
tal health services).122 Some CBAs use secondary data to inves-
tigate the costs and benefits at a single point in time, without
comparison to other alternatives,123 while others use quasi-
experimental designs, comparing the costs and benefits of
individuals in specialty courts versus traditional courts or indi-
viduals not in specialty courts.124 Ultimately, the results of a
CBA would advise decision makers whether to continue, dis-
continue, or alter specialty courts. 
As this review illustrates, a formal CBA is quite complex,
and would require someone with specific training. However, a
CBA could be much less formal if a jurisdiction did not have
the funds or personnel to conduct a more rigorous (and likely
accurate) analysis. If specialty courts are requesting funding,
they should build in the cost to have a professional CBA con-
ducted. Such analyses can help ensure that the courts’ efforts
are maximally productive.
While a needs assessment can determine whether there is a
demand for a specialty court and CBA can provide (sometimes
estimated) dollar figures representing costs and benefits, inter-
pretation is often subjective and a decision is inherently com-
plex. The current political climate and justice philosophy can
also influence whether money is spent on programs and poli-
cies that are retributive, are rehabilitative, or reach other jus-
tice goals. Thus, the pure dollar amount and economic assess-
ments are helpful, but not definitive,125 as are the perceived
needs of the community. Ultimately it is the decision of the
individual judges and court administrators whether a specialty
court is needed and cost-effective for their jurisdiction. 
CHALLENGES FACING INTERNATIONAL COURTS
ADOPTING U.S. MODELS
Specialty courts might also proliferate internationally.
Adopting preexisting American specialty court models could
impede the success of future international specialty courts and
prove challenging for international judges seeking to integrate
American specialty court models in their country. For exam-
ple, many specialty court models are likely modified to adapt
to the local political, legal, and social climate. In England, pro-
bation officers and departments play a greater role in drug and
domestic violence matters (e.g., drug testing and follow-up)
than they do in American courts.126 As such, judges might be
less involved in judicial supervision and review, which is con-
sidered a prominent component of American problem-solving
courts.127 American problem-solving court models are also
sometimes modified to account for cultural differences. In
comparison to other countries, American specialty court
dynamics might be viewed as especially emotionally expressive
(e.g., hugging, applause). Judges in Scotland, England, and Ire-
land have expressed that more understated and less ceremoni-
ous interactions with clients are more appropriate in their
countries.128 To a lesser extent, judges in Canada and Australia
have conveyed a similar sentiment. There are also differences
in treatment approaches. For example, England is much more
likely than the U.S. to incorporate methadone maintenance
“All specialty
courts should
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treatment protocols rather than group programs like Alco-
holics Anonymous.129 Finally, some Domestic Violence Court
practitioners in Canada consider violence to be more of a
learned behavior than an illness and promote domestic vio-
lence education rather than treatment, which is more likely in
U.S. specialty courts.130 Of course, structural and cultural con-
straints can impact a host of American districts as well. In sum,
future iterations of international (and domestic) specialty
courts are likely to be molded by salient social and cultural fac-
tors. 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Problem-solving courts are a likely prominent fixture in the
American, and perhaps international, landscape, at least for the
time being. Specialty courts began with a single Drug Court in
Miami and have grown exponentially. They have evolved con-
siderably in the types of crimes and problems they address and
the population(s) they target. Lessons learned from the past
and present allow us to offer recommendations for their future.   
Judges looking to adopt a specialty court should first con-
duct a needs assessment and consider starting with a small-
scale pilot program that is adequately equipped with short-
and long-term data-collection protocols and performance mea-
sures to identify strengths and weaknesses. All specialty courts
should have a clear mission statement and delineated bench-
marks.131 Specialty courts need to be adequately structured to
effectively assess and identify appropriate participants and to
quickly link them with suitable treatment or social service
providers.132 Similarly, specialty courts need to make sure that
adequate quantities of resources exist (e.g., treatment
providers, affordable housing, employment opportunities) and
that courts offer more than one type of service. Moreover, spe-
cialty courts need to have clear and effectual (e.g., evidence-
based) protocols in place for noncompliance or reoffending.
Finally, interpreting needs assessments and CBAs is a subjec-
tive endeavor. If 65% of the community is in favor of a spe-
cialty court, or if 1,000 people will benefit, does that mean it is
“needed?” If the costs are $5,000 a year more than the benefits,
does that automatically mean the program is not worth it? Pol-
icymakers, judges, and court administrators have to decide
whether a program or policy, even if it is costly, should be
adopted or maintained.
Specialty courts certainly have the potential to positively
impact clients, the criminal justice system, and society as a
whole. However, it is not worthwhile to move forward without
considering what we have learned from the past. Perhaps most
importantly, specialty courts practitioners need to take steps to
document and assess current practices to further research and
inform future iterations (i.e., establish best practices)133 so that
favorable outcomes can be achieved for all those involved. 
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APPENDIX
FURTHER READING ABOUT NEEDS ASSESSMENTS




Conducting a Needs Assessment:  
https://cyfar.org/ilm_1_9
How to do a community needs assessment: 
http://www.lgbtcenters.org/how-to-do-a-community-needs-
assessment.aspx
FURTHER READING ABOUT COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES
Jody Brook et al., Family Drug Treatment Courts as Comprehen-
sive Service Models: Cost Considerations, 67 JUV. & FAM. CT. J.
23 (2016)
Court Review - Volume 54 23
Kathryn E McCollister et al., Estimating the Differential Costs of
Criminal Activity for Juvenile Drug Court Participants: Chal-
lenges and Recommendations, 36 J. OF BEHAV. HEALTH SERVICES &
RES. 111 (2009).
INTRODUCTION TO STARTING NEW SPECIALTY
COURTS
SCHOLARLY ARTICLES AND BOOKS
Problem Solving Courts Resource Guide:
http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Alternative-Dockets/Problem-
Solving-Courts/Resource-Guide.aspx
National Center for State Courts list of resources: 
http://www.ncsc.org/topics/alternative-dockets/problem-solv-
ing-courts/community-courts/resource-guide.aspx
Jeffrey Butts, Introduction: Problem-Solving Courts, 23 LAW &
POL’Y 121 (2001). 






OTHER SPECIALTY COURT GENERAL INFORMATION
Problem Solving Toolkit: 
http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/spcts/
id/147
National Drug Court Institute: 
http://www.nadcp.org/sites/default/files/2014/Painting%20the
%20Current%20Picture%202016.pdf
America’s Problem Solving Courts: 
https://www.nacdl.org/criminaldefense.aspx?id=20191&libID
=20161
Lessons from Problem Solving: 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/Dont%20Rei
nvent.pdf
Problem Solving in Conventional Courts: 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/Breaking_W
ith_Tradition1.pdf







Problem Solving Courts: Models and Trends: 
http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/spcts/
id/169





Drug Courts—Measures, Evaluation, Costs: 
http://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/drug-courts/Pages/measures-
evaluation.aspx
Domestic Violence Courts: 
http:/ /www.nij.gov/topics/courts/domestic-violence-
courts/pages/welcome.aspx
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Footnotes
1. The Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court collected data on the impact
of its approach to the Florida foreclosure crisis to satisfy require-
ments imposed by state and local legislators as a condition of
receiving additional funding. The other three reforms were rigor-
ously evaluated by the National Center for State Courts (NCSC).
2. The Model Time Standards for State Trial Courts were adopted by
the Conference of Chief Justices, the Conference of State Court
Administrators, the National Association for Court Management,
and the ABA House of Delegates in August 2011. RICHARD VAN
DUIZEND et al., MODEL TIME STANDARDS FOR STATE TRIAL COURTS
(2011).
3. Clearance rates reflect the number of outgoing (closed) cases as a
percentage of income (newly filed) cases. See CourTools Measure
2 (2005).
4. The study reported estimated costs at the 25th, 50th and 75th
percentiles (the interquartile range) for cases disposed at different
stages of litigation. For each of the case types studied, litigation
costs doubled from the 25th to the 50th percentile, and then dou-
bled again from the 50th to the 75th percentile, resulting in a sur-
prisingly broad range of costs at every stage of litigation. Paula
Hannaford-Agor, Measuring the Cost of Civil Litigation: Findings
from a Survey of Trial Lawyers, VOIR DIRE 22 (Spring 2013).
For more than a century, excessive costs and delays havebeen a chronic complaint about the American civil justicesystem. Although some states took steps to improve civil
case processing in the past, most of those efforts had only a
negligible effect, if any, and few were able to sustain those
effects over time. Recently, however, a number of states have
implemented civil justice reforms that couple changes in pro-
cedural rules with improved civil case automation and staffing
models that offer new hope for significant improvements in
civil case processing. This paper focuses on four reforms
implemented in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court of Florida
(Miami-Dade); in Strafford and Carroll counties, New Hamp-
shire; and statewide in Utah and Texas.1
The working assumption for all four reforms was that
streamlining the litigation process,
providing more effective oversight,
and reducing opportunities for
satellite litigation would save liti-
gants both time and money without
compromising fairness. Assessing
the impact of the reform on time is
a fairly straightforward task.  Time-
to-disposition is a standard mea-
sure that courts have used for
decades to assess performance.
Many states have adopted explicit
time standards for civil cases based
on either the Model Time Standards
for State Trial Courts2 or state-spe-
cific time standards. Most states also monitor clearance rates to
identify backlogs before they become excessive.3
Monetary savings, in contrast, have historically been diffi-
cult to estimate due to lawyers’ reluctance to disclose the
details of client financial transactions. In 2013, the National
Center for State Courts (NCSC) surveyed experienced attor-
neys about the amount of time expended to complete litigation
tasks and used those responses to generate estimates of legal
and expert witness fees for a variety of civil case cases (Figure
1).4 Trials were the single most expensive stage of litigation,
followed by discovery, pretrial preparation, case initiation, and
settlement negotiations. Theoretically, therefore, civil justice
reforms that streamline discovery and that promote non-trial
case resolution could reasonably be expected to reduce litiga-
tion costs. Cases that were disposed by summary judgment or
trial would also benefit from a streamlined process that
reduced discovery and pretrial costs. This article describes
findings from the evaluations of those reforms and, where pos-
sible, combines estimates of costs expended in civil litigation
with data from these evaluations to offer preliminary estimates
of the cost savings to litigants.
ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF FLORIDA
The 2008-2009 economic recession precipitated a spike in
mortgage foreclosure actions across the country. In Florida,
mortgage foreclosure cases increased by 233 percent between
2006 and 2009 statewide, and by 276 percent in the Eleventh
Judicial Circuit Court (Miami-Dade). Traditional case manage-
ment had been performed by judges, who examined the needs of
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Figure 1: Median Costs of Litigation by Case Type
5. The NCSC evaluation compared key case-processing events and
outcomes for civil cases filed before and after implementation of
the PAD Rules. Debt collection and tort cases comprised nearly
two-thirds of the civil caseloads in those samples (34% and 29%,
respectively). NCSC staff also interviewed key stakeholders
involved in the development and implementation of the PAD Pilot
Rules, as well as attorneys who had litigated cases under the PAD
Pilot Rules, but who were not involved in their development.
PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., NEW HAMPSHIRE: IMPACT OF THE
PROPORTIONAL DISCOVERY/AUTOMATIC DISCLOSURE (PAD) PILOT
RULES (August 19, 2013).
cases one by one as each case was presented by attorneys. The
foreclosure crisis turned that model upside down, as attorneys
had more cases than they could manage and quality control was
erratic. To address the crisis, the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court
obtained funding to develop a case management system featur-
ing four distinct tiers of processing and oversight: technology,
clerical staff, skilled (professional) staff, and judicial staff. 
The design of this staffing model was based on two key
premises. First, judicial involvement in case management pro-
duces momentum toward resolution only if the case is in a
position to move to the next stage in litigation at the time the
judge is asked to intervene. Second, a judge is the most expert,
highly trained, and expensive human resource in the court sys-
tem. Thus, the intent of the staffing model was to ensure that
judges would not perform routine case reviews that could be
performed by less expensive court staff. Each staffing tier was
assigned tasks that matched the training level of the individu-
als employed in that capacity. The staffing model was imple-
mented in two divisions of the Circuit Court to address the
backlog of foreclosure cases in 2011. 
The court collected data for evaluation purposes on the
clearance rates for all divisions managing mortgage foreclosure
cases. The clearance rate for the two divisions using the
staffing model was nearly double (281%) compared to the divi-
sion that did not employ the staffing model (145%). Moreover,
newly filed cases were disposed considerably faster under the
staffing model. Nearly two-thirds of cases (62%) were disposed
within 12 months compared to 45 percent of cases in the divi-
sion that did not employ the staffing model. Eighty percent
(80%) of newly filed cases were disposed within 18 months
compared to only half (52%) of cases in the division that did
not employ the staffing model.
The NCSC has not developed time and cost estimates for
mortgage foreclosure cases, so it is not possible to estimate the
financial impact of the staffing model on litigant costs. But it is
reasonable to assume that the reduced disposition time trans-
lates to a reduction in litigant costs overall, particularly when
the reduced disposition time is due to increased court over-
sight of litigant filings to prevent court hearings from taking
place on cases in which the litigants are unprepared to pro-
ceed. While court hearings are necessarily expensive events,
those costs are considerably more justifiable when they move
the case toward resolution than when they merely result in a
continuance to allow the parties more time to prepare.
NEW HAMPSHIRE PAD PILOT RULES 
The New Hampshire reforms involved implementation of
the Proportional Discovery/Automatic Disclosure (PAD) Rules
on a pilot basis in two counties effective October 1, 2010. The
rules were expected to change litigation practice in a number
of ways, but the most significant changes involved changing
the pleading requirement from a notice pleading to a fact-
pleading standard and the introduction of a mandatory disclo-
sure requirement. The change in the fact-pleading standard
was expected to reduce the time to disposition, mostly by
reducing the amount of time expended on case initiation and
discovery. The introduction of the mandatory disclosure
requirement was expected to reduce the amount of time
needed to complete discovery, which in turn would reduce
overall time to disposition, as well as reduce the incidence of
satellite litigation involving discovery disputes.5
Ironically, neither of the expected effects of the PAD Rules
ultimately occurred. Anecdotal reports suggested that the cases
were getting underway somewhat faster due to the new rules,
but were not actually resolving at a faster rate. A possible rea-
son was that the PAD Rules replaced a requirement for an in-
court case-scheduling conference with a requirement that
attorneys submit a joint case-scheduling order, but did not
expressly impose expectations for timeliness. Consequently,
attorneys adopted the same time frames for completing litiga-
tion tasks that they had before the rules went into effect. 
The PAD Rules likewise did not affect the rate of discovery
disputes, which arose in approximately one-tenth of civil cases
in both the pre-implementation and post-implementation peri-
ods. These rates do not, on their face, suggest an overly liti-
gious legal culture in which lawyers routinely complain of
excessive discovery demands. This does not discount the pos-
sibility that discovery disputes occur, but if they are generally
resolved without court involvement, they would be difficult to
control through procedural rules. 
An unexpected impact of the PAD Rules was a decrease in
the rate of default judgments from 19 percent to 12 percent
overall, which was attributed to the increased amount of infor-
mation disclosed about the plaintiff’s claims under a fact-
pleading standard. This effect was observed across all case cat-
egories (Figure 2). Yet the reduction in default rates did not
uniformly translate to increased rates of other dispositions.
Tort cases, for example, were more likely to be dismissed or
withdrawn under the PAD rules, but there was no increase in
judgment rates and a slight decrease in settlement rates. Con-
tract cases experienced a significant increase in formal judg-
ment rates that corresponded almost exactly with the decrease
in default rates. Real property cases experienced a significant
increase in both settlement and formal judgments rates under
the PAD rules, but no difference was observed in the dismissal
rate. For agency appeals, the decrease in the default rate was
relatively modest, but the dismissal rate decreased by almost
half (37 percent to 19 percent) and the judgment rate nearly
doubled (12 percent to 23 percent).
Looking at these effects through the lens of litigation costs
might reasonably prompt the conclusion that litigant costs had
increased in many cases. By making an appearance, defendants
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6. Automobile tort and premises liability cases comprised 45 percent
of tort cases, and debt collection cases comprised 72 percent of
contract cases in the New Hampshire caseload.
7. For the evaluation, the NCSC analyzed case-level data for all cases
filed January 1 to June 30, 2011 (pre-implementation sample) and
January 1 to June 30, 2012 (post-implementation sample). The
NCSC also surveyed attorneys who filed cases in the post-imple-
mentation sample and conducted focus groups with Utah district
court judges. The attorney surveys collected information about
discovery practices that would not ordinarily be documented in
the case management system, attorney opinions about the Rule 26
revisions, and estimates of the amount of time expended on vari-
ous litigation tasks for different types of cases.
8. Discovery does not occur in uncontested cases. Consequently, the
NCSC evaluation focused only on cases in which an answer or
other responsive pleading was filed.
would naturally incur the costs of filing an answer and other-
wise engaging in discovery, pretrial motions, and possibly trial
proceedings. Except for cases in which the plaintiff filed a
motion to dismiss or to withdraw the case, plaintiffs likewise
would have to take additional steps beyond filing a motion for
a default judgment. Based on NCSC’s “Civil Litigation Cost
Model Project” (CLCM) litigation cost estimates, the addi-
tional median costs incurred by the plaintiff in settling cases
that would have resulted in a default judgment before the PAD
Rules could range up to $800 in a debt collection case, $12,000
in an automobile tort case, $14,400 in a premises liability case,
and nearly $20,000 in a real property case.6 Yet, by providing
sufficient information on which the defendant can assess the
legitimacy of the plaintiff’s claims, the PAD rules evidently
made it worthwhile for defendants to respond to the lawsuit
rather than accepting a default judgment. Like the mortgage
foreclosure staffing model implemented by the Eleventh Judi-
cial Circuit Court in Florida, the New Hampshire PAD rules
introduced a procedural reform that increased the likelihood
that meaningful litigation would take place, ostensibly improv-
ing the likelihood of a just outcome.
UTAH RULE 26 EVALUATION  
The Utah civil justice reforms focused exclusively on the dis-
covery stage of litigation. Amendments to Rule 26 and other
rules governing discovery were implemented on a statewide
basis on November 1, 2011. The rules introduced an explicit
proportionality requirement in discovery, shifted the burden of
demonstrating the relevance and proportionality of discovery
requests to the party requesting discovery, and established three
distinct “discovery tiers” with a presumptive scope of discovery
based on amount-in-controversy for each tier. The amended
rules also introduced a mandatory disclosure requirement and
an expedited process for resolving discovery disputes.7 The
anticipated impact of the Rule 26 revisions included
decreased time to complete discovery and a corre-
sponding decrease in time to disposition in contested
cases,8 a decrease in the frequency of discovery dis-
putes, and a reduction in associated litigation costs.  
The revisions to Rule 26 significantly decreased the
time to disposition for all case types and at all discov-
ery tiers in the post-implementation sample of cases.
The most immediate impact occurred in debt collec-
tion cases involving amounts-in-controversy less than
$50,000 (Tier 1), which disposed at significantly
faster rates beginning within 90 days after filing. Non-
debt collection cases and civil cases alleging damages
greater than $50,000 also disposed at faster rates, but
only beginning 12 months after filing.     
Another impact of the discovery reforms was the manner in
which civil cases disposed. Across all case types and discovery
tiers, civil cases were more likely to settle, rather than be dis-
posed by judgment, following implementation of the reforms.
The single largest effect occurred in non-debt collection cases
alleging damages less than $50,000, for which settlement rates
increased by more than two-thirds. Civil cases alleging dam-
ages more than $50,000 also settled at significantly higher
rates (Figure 3).  
Cases that settle avoid the costs associated with proceeding
to a disposition by summary judgment or trial. Based on the
NCSC costs estimates, for example, parties in a non-debt col-
lection contract case that settled rather than seeking a trial
judgment would save as much as $58,000 each in litigation
costs. If the parties could settle without formal settlement
negotiations or ADR, they could save up to an additional
$17,000 per side. These estimates assume that the settlement
occurs after discovery is complete; however, the NCSC evalu-
ation also found that more than half (54%) of the cases in the
Utah evaluation resolved before discovery was complete. In
fact, one-third of civil cases had no discovery other than
mandatory disclosures. Moreover, fewer discovery disputes
were filed following the Rule 26 revisions. Although it is not
possible to quantify those savings in precise terms, reducing
the amount of discovery and associated opportunities for dis-
putes over discovery suggests the potential for additional sav-
ings of up to $12,000.
TEXAS EXPEDITED ACTIONS RULES
The Texas Expedited Actions Rules, which became effective
on March 1, 2013, impose restrictions on civil cases valued
$100,000 or less. The rules specify an expedited timeline for
discovery and trial in which discovery commences immedi-
ately upon filing and must be concluded within 180 days of
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information that is not ordinarily reflected in the case manage-
ment system. To supplement the case-level and attorney survey
data, research staff from the Texas Administrative Office of the
Courts and students from Baylor University Law School con-
ducted in-depth interviews with judges, case coordinators, and
attorneys who had experience with the rules. Like the Utah Rule
26 revisions, implementation of the Texas Expedited Actions
Rules resulted in a significant shift from cases resolved by judg-
ment to cases resolved by settlement and a significant decrease in
the time to disposition. Attorneys reported high compliance with
the rules, even with greatly restricted scope of discovery.
10. Cases disposed by summary judgment or trial appeared to take
longer to dispose. Upon closer examination, however, it became
apparent that the increased settlement rate was taking place in rel-
atively uncomplicated contract cases that previously would have
been disposed by bench trial early in the case. Only the more
complex contract and tort cases remained for trial, and although
these cases needed comparatively more time for discovery and
pretrial motions, they were still being tried earlier than compara-
ble cases before the expedited actions rules were enacted.
11. CONFERENCE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES, CCJ Civil Justice Improvements
Committee, Call to Action: Achieving Civil Justice for All 16 (2016).
serving the first discovery request. The trial must be scheduled
no later than 90 days after the completion of discovery. The
rules also significantly restrict the scope of discovery to no
more than 6 hours of oral depositions for all witnesses, no
more than 15 written interrogatories, no more than 15 requests
for production, and no more than 15 requests for admissions.
Finally, the rules impose restrictions on court-ordered ADR.
The NCSC evaluated the impact of the rules on contested cases
filed in the courts at law in five urban counties.9
Like the Utah Rule 26 revisions, implementation of the Texas
Expedited Actions Rules resulted in significantly increased set-
tlement rates. Overall, the proportion of cases disposed by set-
tlement increased from 49 percent to 66 percent, with com-
mensurate decreases in summary judgment and trial rates. The
settlement rate for commercial contract cases increased by more
than half (54%), followed by debt collection cases (34%) and
automobile tort cases (5%). In addition to increased settlement
rates, settlements occurred on average (median) five months
earlier than settlements that occurred before implementation of
the expedited actions rules. More than one-third of the cases
resolved with no formal discovery over than mandatory disclo-
sures. Based on the NCSC estimates, the cost savings associated
with settling cases with little or no formal discovery, rather than
proceeding to summary judgment or trial, ranges from just over
$1,000 in debt collection cases to as much as $70,000 per side
in commercial contract disputes.
The increase in settlement rates was greatest in contract
cases, which comprised more than two-thirds of the civil case-
load in the NCSC evaluation. The settlement rate in non-auto-
mobile tort cases decreased, however, due to a significant
increase in trial rates.10 Moreover, nearly half of attorneys
reported that it would have been economically feasible to bring
the case to trial, even in cases that ultimately settled, which
accomplished an explicit objective of the rules to ensure that
parties who wanted a trial on the merits could afford to do so.
Thus, while the increase in trial rates for those cases would
result in up to $45,000 in increased costs per side, litigants
may view those costs as warranted to secure a fair outcome.
CONCLUSIONS
The four civil justice reforms discussed above have been the
focus of intense interest by judicial and legal policymakers.
Many of the concepts embodied in these reforms have been
incorporated in the Recommendations of the CCJ Civil Justice
Improvements Committee as necessary components of state
court efforts “to promote the just, prompt, and inexpensive
resolution of civil cases.”11 Three of these reforms focus on dis-
crete aspects of contemporary civil litigation (e.g., pleading,
discovery, caseflow management), while the Texas approach
was somewhat more comprehensive in scope. 
The precise nature of the impact of these reforms varied
somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but all of them
ultimately had a positive effect on the manner of disposition,
time to disposition, or other key case performance measures.
For example, the Utah and Texas reforms both
resulted in substantial increases in settlement rates.
All the reforms except the New Hampshire PAD Rules
dramatically reduced disposition times. Increased set-
tlement rates and reduced time to disposition intu-
itively support predictions of greatly reduced litiga-
tion costs. Cases that settle relatively early in the liti-
gation process avoid the costs associated with expen-
sive court proceedings such as summary judgment
hearings and bench or jury trials. Of course, these
effects would not apply to all cases and likely differ by
jurisdiction and by case type. The impact of the New
Hampshire PAD Rules is unusual insofar that the pri-
mary impact was a significant reduction in the default
judgment rate. This results in a larger proportion of
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defendants filing an appearance to contest the plaintiff’s
claims, which would necessarily incur additional litigation
costs and time for both sides.
Perhaps the most important point about these reforms is
that they provide incentives to litigants to engage in more
meaningful litigation activities. Mandatory disclosures, for
example, displace much of the need for traditional discovery
practice as well as minimize opportunities for disputes to arise.
An accelerated time frame for completing key stages of litiga-
tion prompts litigants to focus on the issues that form the crux
of the dispute. And delegating routine case management to
court staff facilitates more targeted and meaningful judicial
involvement in the case, providing incentives for parties to
prepare adequately for routine court deadlines and events.
Consequently, when litigation activity takes place resulting in
some cost to litigants, those costs are presumably incurred
with the intent to bring the case to a fair outcome. 
There are, of course, several additional questions related to
the premise that litigation costs should only be incurred for
tasks that are truly necessary to resolve the case. The first is
whether the litigants themselves believe that the value of any
individual task associated with the litigation justifies its actual
costs. Although civil justice reforms may reduce litigation
costs, it does not necessarily follow that litigants will agree that
the value of those tasks outweighs the cost.12 A second ques-
tion is whether litigants have sufficient information about the
likely outcome of the litigation with which to make an
informed judgment about undertaking various litigation tasks.
A related question is whether litigants are given the opportu-
nity to give informed consent to the anticipated costs of litiga-
tion before they are actually incurred. None of these questions
are addressed in this article, but the types of civil justice
reforms discussed here render those questions more salient
insofar that litigants can have greater confidence that any costs
expended in litigation are more likely to ensure a meaningful
litigation experience than before.
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1. The term DWI is used throughout this essay as the designation
preferred by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
and it is used interchangeably with the terms preferred in some
states: DUI, driving under the influence and OWI, operating
while intoxicated. 
2. James D. Stuart, Deterrence, Desert, and Drunk Driving, 3 PUB. AFF.
Q. 105-115 (1989).
3. BARRON H. LERNER, ONE FOR THE ROAD: DRUNK DRIVING SINCE 1900
6 (2011).  
4. Joseph D. Whitaker, A National Outrage: Drunken Drivers Kill
26,000 Each Year, WASH. POST, March 22, 1981, at A1, A6. 
5. David J. Wallace, Do DWI Courts Work?, in FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE
COURTS 92-95 (Carol R. Flango et al. eds., 2008).
6. Stuart, supra note 2.
7. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. & NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL
ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM, A GUIDE TO SENTENCING DWI OFFENDERS
(2d ed., 2005) [hereinafter NHTSA & NIAA].
8. The focus of this article is on the treatment versus punishment
dichotomy. Other purposes of sentencing will be subsumed under
these broader headings. For example, deterrence is often listed as
a purpose of sentencing. If deterrence is specific to an offender,
incarceration may be considered a deterrent. But the threat of
punishment is a specific deterrent and thus deterrence is listed in
the punishment category. (The concept of seeing punishment
meted out is a deterrent to others may or may not be valid, but is
not relevant to this discussion, which is limited to sentencing
options for specific offenses). Incapacitation is also often listed as
a separate purpose of sentencing, but to me the goal of the inca-
pacitation is what makes it relevant—it is to punish the offenders
and to prevent them from harming themselves and others. Resti-
tution is intended to at least partly return the victim(s) to status
quo ante, and that could be seen as a combination of punishment
and a first step in treatment. The options become clearer when the
basic question is whether sentencing is intended to punish offend-
ers who have harmed society or to rehabilitate the offenders so
they will not offend again. 
Alcohol-related crashes are responsible for many of thetraffic fatalities in the United States, and the sad thingis that many of these are preventable. Yet the attitude of
the public toward driving while impaired (DWI)1 is conflicted,
and that ambivalence is reflected in the criminal justice
process. Unlike other crimes, or even smoking, the goal of the
law is not to cease all drinking and driving, just drinking that
impairs judgment and the ability to drive safely. The question
then becomes how much drinking is acceptable before driving,
which can vary by health, weight, and tolerance of the indi-
vidual. On one hand, we as a society want to punish the
offender who kills or seriously maims someone because of
impaired driving, but on the other, we don’t want to enroll the
“social drinker” into the criminal justice system. Conse-
quently, it was not unusual in our history to either let impaired
drivers off the hook with a warning or reduce their charges to
lesser misdemeanors. After all, many impaired drivers do not
harm others and those that do did not intend to cause harm.
Therefore, some observers argued that DWI offenders should
not receive severe punishments.2 Even if victims were severely
injured or killed, prosecutions for manslaughter were rare, and
even license suspensions and jail time were imposed infre-
quently.3 The words of Judge Robert S. Heise echo the thoughts
of many: 
The philosophy of some people is that you have to
make the punishment fit the crime. But that’s the wrong
way to look at drunk drivers. These are social drinkers
who went a little overboard. They’re not alcoholics or
criminals. Most of the time they’ve done nothing danger-
ous, but have merely violated a law…I just feel that some
of these people [convicted of drunken-driving deaths]
have already suffered more than I could impose on them.4
The traditional method of dealing with DWI cases has been
to use the criminal justice system to arrest, prosecute, convict,
and sentence impaired drivers. However, traditional remedies,
such as incarcerating offenders, have not proven effective in
preventing repeat offenders and may have even increased
recidivism.5 Consequently, even the criminal justice system
has recognized that addiction is a health problem and treat-
ment of offenders is the preferred solution, either alone or in
conjunction with other sanctions. This, however, leaves the
unanswered residual question of whether any punishment is
deserved, and if so, what type?6
Courts have a role to play in reducing the incidence of
impaired driving, especially by selecting sentences that are
effective. A significant amount of work on sentencing options
has already been done by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) and the National Institute on Alco-
hol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAA) in their Guide to Sentencing
DWI Offenders.7 With advice from a multidisciplinary working
group of experts, the Guide summarized 30 years of research
on the effectiveness of various sanctions on impaired drivers. 
Although the Guide does an excellent job in describing the
various sentencing options available to judges, including a
checklist of DWI sentencing options and precise estimates of
their likelihood of success, it assumes that judicial sentences
can both sanction and treat the offender. It is with this premise
that sentencing can both punish and treat that I take issue with
here. And the issue is not merely academic. Judges must be
clear about what they want to accomplish with sentencing
because the options available when rehabilitation is the goal
are very different than when punishment is the goal.8 Conflat-
ing the contradictory goals of treatment and punishment leads to
a lack of clarity in sentencing behavior and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, to unclear measures of success.
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9. NHTSA, INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS IMPAIRED DRIVING 3 (2003). 
10. JEFFERY S. TAUBER & C. WEST HUDDLESTON, NAT’L DRUG CT. INST.,
DUI/DRUG COURTS: DEFINING A NATIONAL STRATEGY 5 (1999).
11. The distinction between the legal approach to crime and the med-
ical approach is discussed in VICTOR E. FLANGO & THOMAS M.
CLARKE, REIMAGINING COURTS, Ch. 8 (2015) and reflects a much
earlier debate on sentencing: should the punishment fit the crime
or fit the criminal? The need for separating problem-solving
processes and traditional adversarial court processes is discussed
in Victor E. Flango, Never the Twain Shall Meet: Why Problem-Solv-
ing Principles Should Not Be Grafted onto Mainstream Courts, 100
JUDICATURE 30-36 (2016). Another way of portraying the different
models is that the sciences (including medicine) are inherently
probabilistic and subject to revision as new information becomes
available, whereas the law demands the appearance of certainty
and irrevocability. See, e.g. GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL
EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS 11-22 (3rd ed. 2007). 
12. Donal E.J. MacNamara, The Medical Model in Corrections: Requi-
escat in Pace, 14 CRIMINOLOGY 439, 439-40 (1977).
13. ALAN CAVAIOLA & CHARLES WUTH, ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF
THE DWI OFFENDER (2002). 
14. Donald J. Farole, Applying Problem-Solving Principles in Main-
stream Courts: Lessons for State Courts, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 65 (2005).
THE GOAL OF DWI SENTENCING: PUNISHMENT OR
TREATMENT?
A LEGAL OR MEDICAL APPROACH TO DWI
NHTSA’s A Guide to Sentencing DWI Offenders says
“[s]entencing for DWI should be consistent from one court to
another regardless of jurisdiction, yet balanced with the need
for matching offenders to the most appropriate sanctions and
extent of treatment.”9 In their discussion of DWI courts,
Tauber and Huddleston are even more direct in identifying the
mixed purpose of sentencing: 
…to make offenders accountable for their actions,
bringing about a behavioral change that ends recidivism,
stops the abuse of alcohol, and protects the public; to
treat the victims of DWI offenders in a fair and just way;
and to educate the public as to the benefits of DWI Courts
for the communities they serve.10
Note that this mission seems to expect courts to treat the
disease and to sanction the offender. The argument here is that
it is logically impossible for sentences to be consistent across
similar DWI offenses and at the same time tailored to meet the
needs of individual offenders, whose needs and degree of
addiction to alcohol vary widely. Consistency represents the
legal approach to sentencing, whereas individual treatment
represents a very different, medical approach to sentencing.
These conflicting approaches need to be kept clear and distinct
for judges to sentence DWI offenders appropriately.11
The traditional legal approach emphasizes the crime by
determining responsibility and then meting out punishment
when the offender is deemed to be guilty. The basic premise of
the legal approach is that humans are all equal before the law.
In practice, that means treating “like cases alike”—that is, fair-
ness requires that everyone who commits a similar offense
receive a similar consequence. Conditions for finding an
accused at fault should be the same for all individuals in simi-
lar circumstances. To do otherwise undermines citizen respect
not only for courts but for law and government as well.
On the other hand, the medical approach to crime aims to
correct the underlying problems that led to the crime. It
focuses on protecting public safety by directly attacking the
root cause of DWI—alcohol and substance abuse. In its sim-
plest (perhaps oversimplified) terms, the medical approach, as
originally applied in the corrections context, assumes:
… the offender to be
“sick” (physically, mentally,
and/or socially); his offense
to be a manifestation or
symptom of his illness, a cry
for help. Obviously, then,
early and accurate diagnosis,
followed by prompt and
effective therapeutic inter-
vention, assured an affirma-
tive prognosis — rehabilita-
tion.12
The remedial approach attempts to alter the personal risk
factors that lead to impaired driving.13 It treats the individual,
which involves diagnosis of the problem and the development
of an individualized treatment plan—which by its very nature
is antithetical to treating like cases alike. Compliance with
treatment is verified by frequent testing for alcohol and drug
abuse, close community supervision, and frequent court hear-
ings. 
This approach is an extension of the trend toward what was
once called alternative sanctions. Alternative sanctions were
created, at least partially, by the perceived failure of punish-
ment to stop the revolving door of recidivism. As summarized
by one judge: “where the level of punishment required is
diminished by the need to solve the underlying problem…so
you’d rather solve the problem than punish the behavior”14
Restrictions on driving may be imposed as a punishment in
and of itself or as a safeguard to the public until a program of
treatment is completed. It is therefore necessary to classify sen-
tencing options by their intended purpose—punishment or
treatment. As an extreme example, persons involved may not
perceive a distinction between solitary confinement as a pun-
ishment and confinement in a padded cell to prevent a patient
from injuring themselves, but the intentions are different.  
EVALUATION CRITERIA
Evaluating sentencing success is difficult. The argument pro-
posed here is that different evaluation criteria are required to
measure success depending upon whether the goal of the sen-
tence is punishment or treatment. If punishment is the goal,
consistency in sentencing is absolutely essential to assure fair-
ness among offenders convicted of similar DWI offenses. How-
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ever, consistency cannot be
used to measure effectiveness of
treatment programs, which by
their nature must be tailored to
the individual to be successful,
regardless of how others simi-
larly situated were sentenced.
Reduction in recidivism is the
primary way to evaluate the
effectiveness of sentencing to
treatment.  
Before discussing in more
detail the relationship between
sentencing for punishment and treatment, one other compli-
cation must be mentioned. Some offenders apprehended for
the very first time may be unlikely to offend again even with-
out treatment or punishment. Indeed, one study reports that
about a quarter of DWI offenders become repeat offenders, but
a majority of persons arrested for DWI do not repeat the
offense.15 Which of the sentencing options is necessary for that
majority of offenders?  
Consistency of Penalties
The traditional legal approach, with its emphasis on deter-
mining guilt and meting out punishment, in one sense, pro-
vides a good control group. Except to establish a baseline, it is
unfair to use recidivism to measure the success of sentencing
options whose purpose is to punish the offender. If the goal is
punishment, the only criteria for success is: did the offender
complete the punishment, i.e., serve the required sentence, pay
the fine, etc? Consistency of sentences becomes a major con-
cern for the sake of fairness. Indeed, the consistency argument
was used to make a case for specialized DWI enforcement
agencies at the state level, separate incarceration facilities, and
of course, specialized DWI courts.16 That recommendation for
specialized DWI courts was made before the advent of the spe-
cialized problem-solving courts in existence today, but instead
favored specialized courts similar to small-claims court to han-
dle misdemeanor DWI offenses. The growth of problem-solv-
ing courts, including drug courts and their offshoot DWI
courts, represents the increasing emphasis on the medical
approach of treatment and rehabilitation of offenders, which in
turn reduces the number of future arrests, prosecutions, and
court cases. The advantages of specialized DWI courts are
more consistency in sentencing, the prevention of “judge
shopping,” reduction in number of plea agreements, and fewer
pleas to reduced charges, such as reckless driving, as substi-
tutes for DWI guilty pleas.17
More than half (54 percent) of the law enforcement officers
in the Traffic Injury Research Foundation survey reported they
do not believe the penalties imposed by judges reflect the
severity of the offense,18 which illustrates the problems caused
by repeat offenders who continue to drive even when their dri-
ver’s licenses are revoked. 
Without consistency, sentencing disparity results in some
offenders not receiving appropriate sanctions. The causes of
sentencing disparity may be understandable. The range of sen-
tences that can be imposed on a DWI offender, despite a simi-
larity in offender backgrounds and circumstances, is extremely
broad. 
Offenders may be less willing to comply with penalties per-
ceived to be unfair. A California study concluded that individ-
uals who do not believe they are affected by alcohol intoxica-
tion do not respond to the standard penalties for DWI and per-
sist in driving after drinking.19 Thus, disparity detracts from
the deterrent effect of sentences and reduces the potential for
behavioral change. It encourages offenders to manipulate the
system to obtain lesser sentences through practices such as
“judge-shopping,” which is reported to occur either occasion-
ally or often.20 More importantly, the inconsistent application
of penalties creates a public perception of unequal justice. 
Reduction in Recidivism
Recidivism rates are the primary way we use to indicate the
effectiveness of treatment programs and sentences. Recidi-
vism rates have credibility. A survey of Michigan judges and
probation officers found that half reported recidivism to be
an important determinant of a program’s effectiveness.21
The downside of using recidivism rates is that DWI arrests
and crashes are infrequent occurrences even for intoxicated
drivers.22 One survey estimated that the number of times a
person drives drunk before being arrested is 300.23 A more
recent estimate is one arrest per 772 episodes of driving two
hours after drinking.24 Obviously, recidivism rates depend
upon not only the frequency of occurrence of impaired dri-
ving, but also on the level of enforcement in any given com-
munity.
Nevertheless, courts do require feedback on the success
“The downside of
using recidivism
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rates of various treatment programs if they are to improve sen-
tencing effectiveness. Regardless of how recidivism is mea-
sured, recidivism rates should not only be calculated for the
total number of DWI offenders receiving treatment, but also by
types of individual treatment so that courts can determine
which treatments or combination of treatments are most effec-
tive in reducing recidivism. 
QUESTIONS TO PONDER BEFORE SENTENCING 
Before deciding upon a sentence, judges should consider
the following questions: 
HAS GUILT BEEN ESTABLISHED?
Persons charged with DWI need to go through the full
criminal justice process to determine guilt or innocence.
Due process rights of defendants should be protected by a
full adversary process until guilt is determined. Prominent
drug court advocates agree that “[p]roblem solving courts
emphasize traditional due process protections during the
adjudication phase of a case and the achievement of a tan-
gible, constructive outcome post-adjudication.”25 This is
the practice in DWI courts. Sentencing options should be
considered only post-adjudication. 
Diversion programs allow for completion of treatment after
which the DWI charge can be dismissed. This results in no
conviction on the driver’s record and allows repeat offenders to
subsequently be treated as first-time offenders. For commercial
drivers, federal law prohibits judges and prosecutors from
allowing convictions to be deferred, dismissed, or left unre-
ported. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA) forbids a state to “mask, defer imposition of judg-
ment, or allow an individual to enter a diversion program that
would prevent a conviction” from appearing on a commercial
driver’s record (no matter where he or she is licensed) for any
state or local traffic violation in any type of motor vehicle.26
Perhaps for these reasons, NHTSA has recommended that
diversion programs be eliminated.27
Post-adjudication treatment is the more appropriate model
and preferable to deferred prosecution. Diversion programs in
use pretrial are not included because they are not sentencing
options for punishment, and many treatment programs require
an admission of guilt as a precondition of treatment. The ethi-
cal question is: should technically innocent people be forced
into treatment programs before guilt has been adjudicated? As
one scholar noted, “it is not a court if you have to plead guilty
to get there.”28
WHICH SENTENCE GOAL IS
MORE APPROPRIATE—PUN-
ISHMENT OR TREATMENT?
After a guilty judgment or
verdict, the next step is to
decide whether the purpose of
sentencing is to punish or treat
the offender. 
Punishment
The goal of punishment here
is to prevent the offender from
driving while impaired again.
Punishment may incapacitate
the offender while he or she is
in custody, make them pay the costs, and ideally instill fear of
future punishment to lower the chances of recidivism. These
penalties are based on the assumption that drinking and dri-
ving occurs because the driver is not motivated to change his
or her behavior and perhaps to accept inconveniences (e.g.,
relying on a designated driver or taxi) to avoid drunk driving.
In these cases, punishment (or the threat of punishment)
might favorably influence future decision making about drink-
ing and driving.29 However, some recent research based upon
perceptions of risks of legal consequences found that increased
law enforcement and sobriety checkpoints were a more effec-
tive strategy for reducing alcohol-impaired driving than
enhanced penalties.30
Traditional criminal sanctions for DWI include jail, fines,
and actions against the driver’s license.31 If punishment is the
goal, then sentences need to have consistency from offender to
offender for the sentencing process to be deemed fair. That is
not to say that recidivism rates should be calculated, but if they
are, they should only be used as a control group—a baseline
standard of comparison from which to compare the effective-
ness of various treatment options. 
Even using traditional sanctions, judges must consider
the degree of danger to the motoring public. Is there some
percentage of offenders who are so chemically dependent
that incarceration is the only option? Clearly, incarceration is
a deterrent to repeat DWI violations while the offender is in
custody. But does incarceration have a longer-term impact,
and does it depend upon the type of offender? What are the
comparative advantages of jail versus fines, licensing
options, and restrictions on vehicle use? 
Treatment
If treatment is the chosen option, the assumption is that
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Effectiveness here is measured by
recidivism rates. What types of
offenders are the best candidates
for treatment? What risk assess-
ment instruments are available to
help decide when treatment is
most likely to lead to the preferred
result, that is, reducing the likeli-
hood that the offender will drink
and drive in the future?
Most treatment programs
begin with an admission that a
problem exists, and it is often dif-
ficult for the alleged perpetrator to take this first step. Incen-
tives to the offender to encourage a successful treatment pro-
gram would be couched in terms of being able to avoid incar-
ceration, retaining a job so that the family would be supported,
and keeping the family unit together.
How successful are treatment programs? A comprehensive
meta-analysis of 215 interventions found a 7-9% reduction in
DWI recidivism and alcohol-related crashes as a result of com-
pleting a program of intervention.32 That meta-analysis, how-
ever, was done over two decades ago, before newer interven-
tions, such as ignition interlock technology, were available. A
more recent meta-analysis of 42 studies done between 1995
and 2015 also supported programs that used intensive super-
vision and education.33 Unfortunately, there is a dearth of high-
quality evaluations of DWI intervention programs, and the
methodologies used among the studies that do exist are weak,
limiting confidence in the findings.34
WHAT SCREENING INSTRUMENTS ARE AVAILABLE TO
ASSIST CHOICE OF SENTENCING OPTION? 
Marlowe contends that the critical question is: how to
match offenders with the programs that best meet their needs,
while still protecting public safety and keeping costs to a min-
imum?35 He recommends a fourfold classification scheme to
guide intervention based on the two dimensions of “need,” the
offenders’ clinical diagnosis and need for treatment, and “risk,”
or amenability to treatment.
Before judges can decide between punishment and treat-
ment, and even decide from among various treatment alterna-
tives, offenders need to be screened first for treatment eligibil-
ity. Which offenders have a chance to benefit from treatment?
By the same token, then, screening can identify candidates
who would not benefit from treatment and for whom sanctions
are necessary. 
Screening is the use of easily and inexpensively adminis-
tered tests and procedures in an attempt to establish the pres-
ence or absence of alcohol-use disorder, drug-use disorder, and
recidivism risk.36 Proper screening will help identify individu-
als who require more professional and higher cost diagnostic
assessments. Determining the severity of alcohol dependence
is critical to determining an appropriate treatment plan. Many
jurisdictions use self-report instruments to evaluate alcohol
usage, while some jurisdictions use personal interviews as
well. Thirty-one states screen both pre- and post-trial, and 16
screen post-trial only. Most programs require clients to pay
screening fees, although four states pay the fees themselves.37
The issue is further complicated by the growing recogni-
tion that many people with alcohol or drug problems also
experience other psychological problems that may affect the
effectiveness of treatment services. For example, people who
misuse alcohol may suffer from schizophrenia, eating disor-
ders, or post-traumatic stress disorder.38 Also, offenders with
attention deficit disorder are more likely to commit motor-
vehicle-related offenses during the follow up. 39
The diagnostic assessment of all convicted DWI offenders
for alcohol problems, in contrast to screening, is an expensive
proposition. Ensuring that assessments are conducted can be a
major task, depending upon the number of treatment
providers available in the jurisdiction.
When screening indicates the need for assessment, trained
professionals should conduct the assessment. To avoid conflict
of interest, assessment and treatment referral should be con-
ducted by an agency not associated with any treatment pro-
gram. Judges, prosecutors, probation officers, and other justice
system staff should have general knowledge about screening,
assessment, and other issues surrounding alcohol- and drug-
abuse treatment. 
The judge is not a therapist, but she not only needs to know
what treatment options are most effective, but also which are
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The results of assessment and recommendations for treat-
ment should be made available to the judge and prosecutor
before sentencing. Judges and prosecutors should be familiar
with the treatment providers in their jurisdictions and seek
information about the quality of services they provide. Indeed,
they could use their prestige to advocate for the development
of supplemental services and programs as needed.
To ensure fairness in the provision of services to DWI
offenders, courts and treatment providers should consider the
following questions: 
• How are priorities for treatment services determined? 
• Are existing services available equally to individuals in
court who need them?
• Are standardized protocols and risk-assessment inventories
used to identify service needs and placement?
• Are the qualifications of the individuals involved in identi-
fying service needs appropriate for the populations and
problems they are expected to evaluate?
• Do recommended service plans address the specific needs
of individual clients?
• What efforts are made to ensure services are culturally sen-
sitive?
• Who monitors delivery of services and tracks client
progress?40
The preferred instruments for DWI screening are the
MacAndrew Scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory and the Alcohol Use Inventory.41 The screening
instruments most widely used by the courts, however, are the
Mortimer-Filkins and the Michigan Alcoholism Screening
Tests, “despite the lack of published evidence that they are use-
ful with the DWI population.”42 These tests are rated
“medium” overall because they correctly classify offenders as
having alcohol problems, but that is only an indirect measure
of DWI recidivism. The tests are not as good at predicting DWI
recidivism directly. 43
Courts in 21 states use the Mortimer-Filkins screening test.
It was explicitly designed for assessing DWI offenders, and is
based upon a self-report questionnaire and structured inter-
views, although the interviews are sometimes omitted.44 The
questionnaire does not have a component to assess truthfulness
of responses. It was developed
using a sample of known prob-
lem drinkers and a sample of
known non-problem drinkers
and field tested on DWI offend-
ers. Offenders are placed into one
of three risk-categories—social
drinker, presumptive problem
drinker, or problem drinker. 
Courts in 14 states use the
Michigan Alcoholism Screening
Test, or MAST. This 24-item
questionnaire was also developed in 1971 by Melvin Selzer.45 A
Brief MAST of 10-items, a Malmo Modification of 9 items, and
a Short MAST of 13 items also exist. It was created using five
groups: a control group, hospitalized alcoholics, convicted
DWI offenders, drunk and disorderly offenders, and drivers
whose licenses were under review. The design of the MAST
questionnaire has been criticized for the ease with which
clients can falsify responses.46
The Research Institute on Addiction (RIA) and the New York
State Department of Motor Vehicles implemented a new alco-
hol-and-drug-screening instrument called the RIA Self Inven-
tory (RIASI) for use in the New York Drinking Driver Pro-
grams.47 This Inventory seems to be an improvement over the
MAST. Follow up research shows that RIASI can identify indi-
viduals who will experience alcohol and drug problems in the
future.48
The Traffic Injury Research Foundation has published a
more detailed review of risk-assessment instruments and treat-
ment interventions for those practitioners interested in more
discussion of the available instruments.49
Questions remain about the accuracy of the screening
instruments, especially the ones most popular with courts, and
indeed none of the screening instruments in use meet the strin-
gent criteria that are the accepted standard in medical prac-
tice.50 Most screening instruments were first developed in the
1970s, 1980s, and 1990s and are in need of updating and vali-
dation. The screening instrument featured by NHTSA at its
briefing on Impaired Driver Assessment Tools on October 14,
2015 was the American Probation and Parole Association’s
Impaired Driving Assessment.51 Although advertised as a
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screener to be used around the
time of sentencing, this risk
screener was originally designed
to predict recidivism by offenders
already convicted of a DWI offense
to help probation officers discern
the most appropriate level of edu-
cation and treatment services.
At the same briefing in 2015,
NHTSA highlighted The Comput-
erized Assessment and Referral System (CARS), which does
not predict DWI recidivism very well, but does predict crimi-
nal re-offenses generally.52 Like screening instruments, existing
assessment instruments must also be improved and enhanced
to better predict recidivism and to tailor sentencing options to
individual DWI offenders.
SHOULD REPEAT OFFENDERS BE TREATED DIFFER-
ENTLY?
Repeat offenders create a special situation with respect to
the question of punishment or treatment. A quarter of all dri-
vers arrested or convicted of DWI are repeat offenders.53 The
initial reaction is that repeat offenders are hardcore and should
be given the most severe punishments to protect the public.
After all, they have already demonstrated that some forms of
punishment and treatment do not work, and that more inten-
sive sanctions or treatment are required. At this point, milder
sanctions, such as fines, would probably be used less fre-
quently and more serious punishments, such as incarceration,
house arrest with electronic monitoring, license revocation,
and vehicle impoundment may come into play.
On the other hand, many alcohol-impaired offenders need
to “hit bottom” before they take treatment seriously. The para-
dox is that some of these hardcore offenders, who have “hit
bottom,” may be the most likely to benefit from treatment. In
this situation, treatment providers do not “cherry pick”
offenders to boost their success rates, but select the “hard-
core” offenders. Only repeat offenders, for example, are eligi-
ble for treatment in DWI courts according to the National
Center for DWI Courts, which believes that punishment
unaccompanied by treatment is an ineffective deterrent for
hardcore offenders.54 Recidivism among DWI offenders is
high. NHTSA has estimated that one third of all drivers
arrested, convicted or adjudicated for impaired driving are
repeat offenders.55
How are repeat offenders treated now? A survey of Michi-
gan judges found that the most frequently used sanctions for
repeat offenders were driver’s license suspension (91.9%), pro-
bation (88.8%), fines (85.2%), outpatient counseling (83.3%),
support groups (78.3%), mandatory jail (78.1%), and moni-
toring by testing for alcohol (77.1%).56 In a survey of the
American Judges Association, monitoring by testing for alco-
hol, intensive supervision probation, and support groups, such
as Alcoholics Anonymous, were perceived to be most effective,
along with mandatory jail time.57 Judges perceived suspended
sentences and community service as least effective. 
Much of the research on repeat offenders is dated, but the
findings of most of the scientific literature is fairly consistent.
A comprehensive review of the literature on repeat DWI
offenders concluded that it cannot be determined with any
degree of confidence the magnitude of the alcohol-crash prob-
lem caused by repeat DWI offenders.58 The review cited
research from California suggesting that repeat DWI offenders
comprise a small, but not negligible, percentage of drivers (8%
range) involved in traffic crashes. This is important to note
because even if all repeat DWI offenders were taken off the
streets, “at least 90% of all fatal crashes would still remain.”59
This is the “prevention paradox” in which a larger number
of lower-risk individuals may cause more harm than the
smaller number of high-risk individuals. 60 Furthermore, Jones
and Lacey contend that the involvement of repeat offenders in
all crashes may be less than that of first offenders, because
sober repeat offenders may drive more carefully than sober first
offenders.
It is difficult to identify the hardcore, potential repeat
offender. Most existing studies did not have as their primary
purpose distinguishing repeat offenders from others, but were
focused upon evaluating DWI countermeasures and treatment
programs. Consequently, repeat DWI offenses were one of the
variables in the evaluation of programs, but the repeat offend-
ers in treatment programs are not representative of repeat
offenders in general. Moreover, many repeat offenders have
characteristics similar to those of first offenders, assuming this
this is indeed a first offense rather than the first time caught.
Some older studies were unable to distinguish first offenders
from repeat offenders.61 Nonetheless, it was found that repeat
offenders tend to be involved in more crashes, take more
health risks, and report being able to drive safely after more
drinks than first offenders.62
In their review of the literature, Jones and Lacey found that
repeat offenders differed from first offenders in that they did
have a high BAC of 0.18 or more, two or three prior DWI
offenses as well as several “other” traffic citations, and more







38 Court Review - Volume 54 
63. David L. McMillen et al., Personality Traits and Behaviors of Alco-
hol-Impaired Drivers: A Comparison of First and Multiple Offenders,
17 ADDICTIVE BEHAV. 407 (1992).
64. National Center for DWI Courts, www.dwicourts.org.
65. W. J. Rauch et al., Any First Alcohol-Impaired Driving Event is a Sig-
nificant and Substantial Predictor of Future Recidivism, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE 16TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ALCOHOL, DRUGS
AND TRAFFIC SAFETY (Council on Alcohol, Drugs and Traffic Safety,
vol. 1 2002); Paul R. Marque, Robert B. Voas & A. Scott Tippetts,
Behavioral Measures of Drinking, Patterns in the Interlock Record,
98 ADDICTION 13-19 (2003).
66. William J. Rauch et al., Risk of Alcohol-Impaired Driving Recidivism
Among First Offenders and Multiple Offenders, 100 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 919 (2010).
67. JONES & LACEY, supra note 58. 
68. LERNER, supra note 3, at 172.
69. New Survey Results: Stop Anyone Impaired by Alcohol from Driving
Any Vehicle, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, HIGHWAY LOSS DATA
INST. (Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.iihs.org/iihs/news/desktop-
news/new-survey-results-stop-anyone-impaired-by-alcohol-from-
driving-any-vehicle-public-says. 
70. Flango & Cheesman, supra note 57.
71. The Alcohol Use Inventory was developed in 1977 as an assess-
ment tool for treatment planning, rather than a screening tool,
and is currently used only in West Virginia. It is the most expen-
sive of all of the testing instruments evaluated by CHANG ET AL.,
supra note 36 at 29. The McAndrew Scale detected about two
thirds of recidivists, but that research is based upon only a single
offender population and has not been confirmed in other DWI
populations. It is currently used in Arizona, North Carolina and
North Dakota. CHANG ET AL., supra note 36 at 31.
males under age 40, with high school or less education and
blue collar employment. They have also been found to have
more severe mental health problems.63
The National Center for DWI Courts website defines “hard-
core” DWI offenders as “individuals who drive with a BAC of
0.15 percent or greater, or who are arrested for or convicted of
driving while intoxicated after a prior driving while impaired
(DWI) conviction.”64 Indeed, the first alcohol-impaired dri-
ving incident (violation, not just conviction) is a predictor of
future recidivism, as is the number of failed breath test results
on an alcohol ignition interlock device.65 The recidivism rate
among first offenders more closely resembles that of second
offenders than that of nonoffenders.66
Repeat offenders do not seem to respond to punishment.
There is some evidence that incarceration not only fails to
reduce recidivism, but that recidivism increases with even
longer periods of incarceration. Alternative sanctions were
more effective. Jones and Lacey noted that license suspension
or revocation combined with treatment was especially effective
in reducing recidivism.67
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
Historically, the greatest effort to reducing the impaired-
driving problem has involved the legal system, with the
enactment of laws, imposition of penalties, and strengthen-
ing of law enforcement. There is a growing consensus as to
the limits of the law-and-order approach, which brought
about the emphasis on treatment to begin with.
The public health perspective, broadly conceived,
includes treatment for DWI offenders, as well as remedies
like improved public transportation, reducing alcohol avail-
ability through taxation, and opposing alcohol industry
sponsorship of events.68 These remedies seem less directly
related to impaired driving, so now the focus has turned
more to technology. An Insurance Institute for Highway
Safety survey found that two-thirds of Americans favor rou-
tine installation of alcohol detection devices in all cars.69
These devices include ankle bracelets for more “hardcore”
offenders, but more often involve ignition interlocks for even
first-time impaired-driving offenders.70 The ultimate techno-
logical solution, of course, would be the self-driving car. 
For the present, what is the role of the legal system in the
reduction of DWI offenses? The
de facto compromise that seems
to have been reached is to dis-
tinguish “responsible” drinking
and driving, which many peo-
ple do, from irresponsible
impaired driving. This perspec-
tive is supported by the alcohol
industry, which tries to separate
the majority of people who can drink responsibly from the
“hardcore,” alcohol-addicted offenders. But is it the role of the
court to encourage “responsible” drinking or to treat alco-
holism unrelated to criminal offenses? Or should courts be
solely focused on the crime of DWI?
If crashes occur with fatalities or serious injuries, equiva-
lent to manslaughter, punishment is necessary, which means
involvement of the criminal justice system. Although the treat-
ment vs. punishment dichotomy probably is not useful from a
treatment perspective, a key purpose of the legal system is to
assign blame and responsibility, and then to punish the guilty.
So, in law, the role of punishment cannot be ignored and pun-
ishment imposed should be consistent with sentences given to
similar offenders.
If crashes occur with no fatalities or serious injuries, treat-
ment may be the order of the day to reduce possibility of future
recidivism. Then:
1. Screening instruments and assessment tools need to be
updated and improved to help judges determine the most
effective treatment for each offender. Screening is a quick
and inexpensive way to identify individuals who require
more in-depth and expensive diagnostic evaluation to
determine the most effective treatment. Yet, ironically, the
two best screening tools for predicting recidivism are the
ones least used.71
2. When screening indicates the need for more in-depth
assessment, trained officials should conduct the diagno-
sis. To avoid conflicts of interest, assessment and treat-
ment referral should be conducted by an agency not asso-
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3. Treatment options must be selected tailored to each
offender, and consistency of sentences across offenders is
irrelevant. What Marlowe said about drug courts applies
as well to DWI courts:“… no one intervention should be
expected to work for every drug-involved offender.”72
4. Treatment options vary by jurisdiction and the most
appropriate treatment may not be available to meet the
needs of each individual offender. The availability of
health coverage may help influence the treatments used. 
5. Compliance with treatment plans must be closely moni-
tored. For example, if ignition interlocks are part of the
sentence, follow up is necessary to see that they are
installed and used.
6. Swift action is necessary to correct non-compliance with
treatment, with the most severe sanction being elimina-
tion from the treatment program. 
7. Recidivism rates should be calculated separately for each
type of treatment program to provide judges and others
with evidence on which treatments are most effective in
reducing recidivism for each type of offender. 
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The checklist below can be found on http://www.judicialfamilyinstitute.org. The checklist suggests some
ways to be thoughtful about your security, and the security of your family. 
For further information about keeping yourself and your family members safe at home and online, see:
http://www.judicialfamilyinstitute.org/Topics-and-Programs/Security.aspx.
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Good evening. I feel very honored,privileged and humbled this eveningin receiving this most prestigious
award. I must say that I have rather been in
somewhat of a blur for the past few months
since I received a call from my Chief Justice,
Tom Saylor, informing me that I was chosen
as the recipient of the Rehnquist Award. It
was a busy day, and when my tipstaff, Callen
Taylor, told me that the Chief was on the tele-
phone, I was mildly annoyed, because it inter-
rupted my work, but also because I thought
that the Chief was going to ask me to serve on
yet another committee. When he told me the
purpose of his call, I was floored! (Almost lit-
erally—I had to sit down to keep from falling
down!) And since that day, I kept feeling as if I would wake up
to discover that this had been a most pleasant dream.
When I reviewed that list of previous recipients, including
Judge Judith Kaye for whom I had great admiration, I ques-
tioned whether I was worthy of this award. One thing of which
I am very sure is that I am not standing here this evening by
myself. In other words, I am only here because of the support
and teamwork of many others. Those who know me know that
my mantra, so to speak is “Collaboration Rocks!” and I believe
that it really does.
When I thought about what I wanted to or should say this
evening, many thoughts went through my head. But I decided
that I would share with you two things—my vision of our
court system and the things for which I am most thankful. 
Several years ago, my quest to create a trauma-informed
court, began with what Oprah would describe as my “aha
moment.” For you to understand my transformation, I need to
give you a little background about where my journey began.
Before taking the bench in 1999, I had been a prosecutor in
the District Attorney’s Office for nearly 16 years. In that capac-
ity, I tried many serious cases, such as child abuse, sexual
assault and homicide. I was known as a formidable prosecutor,
fair, but tough. I had a good relationship with
the judges in the criminal division of our
court and I thought highly of many of them,
particularly the tough, no-nonsense judges.
These judges took command over their court-
rooms, the proceedings were orderly and for-
mal, they made prompt decisions and no one
dared to challenge their authority. They had
my utmost respect and, as a result, I sought to
emulate what I believed were the best traits in
these judges.
So, when I took the bench, I brought with
me 16 years of prosecutorial experience in an
adversarial system. I sought to have an air of
formality in an informal court system and
decided that as the judge, it was acceptable to
impart my own values upon the parents and children who
appeared before me in dependency and delinquency cases. It
was not uncommon for me to “give a little lecture” or in other
ways express my disapproval at their choices and their
lifestyles. When I think back on some of the things that I said,
I am, quite frankly, ashamed.
So, what was my “aha moment”? I will tell you. One day, I
was sitting on the bench with a courtroom full of people. As
always, the issues presented in juvenile court are weighty. So,
as I looked out among the crowd, I realized that I am a public
servant, paid by the taxpayers. I realized that the people sitting
in my courtroom are the taxpayers, and so technically, I work
for them and that I needed to act like I worked for them. And,
with that in mind, I decided that I should treat them with the
dignity and respect that I would give to any employer and that
every human being and child of God deserves. 
In order to truly embrace, foster and effectively promote
dignity and respect in my courtroom, I needed to become a ser-
vant leader.
The phrase “Servant Leadership” was coined by Robert K.
Greenleaf in The Servant as Leader, an essay that he first pub-
lished in 1970. In that essay, he said:
REMARKS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF
THE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST
AWARD HON. KIM BERKELEY CLARK
The William H. Rehnquist Award for Judicial Excellence is one of our nation’s highest judicial honors. 
Presented annually by the National Center for State Courts, this prestigious award honors a state court judge
who demonstrates the outstanding qualities of judicial excellence, including integrity, fairness, open-mindedness,
knowledge of the law, professional ethics, creativity, sound judgment, intellectual courage, and decisiveness. 
The William H. Rehnquist Award honors judges who are taking bold steps to address a variety of issues affecting
their communities. Pennsylvania family court Judge Kim Berkeley Clark was named the recipient of this award
in 2017 for her creation of a “trauma-informed” courthouse.
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“The servant-leader is servant first…. It begins with the nat-
ural feeling that one wants to serve, to serve first. Then con-
scious choice brings one to aspire to lead. That person is
sharply different from one who is leader first; perhaps because
of the need to assuage an unusual power drive or to acquire
material possessions.…The leader-first and the servant-first are
two extreme types. Between them there are shadings and
blends that are part of the infinite variety of human nature.
“The difference manifests itself in the care taken by the ser-
vant-first to make sure that other people’s highest priority
needs are being served. The best test, and difficult to adminis-
ter, is: Do those served grow as persons? Do they, while being
served, become healthier, wiser, freer, more autonomous, more
likely themselves to become servants? And, what is the effect
on the least privileged in society? Will they benefit or at least
not be further deprived?”
In order to truly embrace, foster and effectively promote
dignity and respect in my courtroom, I had to change or
improve my role as a judge. I now understand that I am a pub-
lic servant, nothing more and nothing less; that the title Judge
defines my role in the judicial system, but this title does not
change the fact that I am a servant. This realization has made
me understand that I can carry out my job of judging without
being judgmental.
My courtroom has been transformed from an adversarial,
trauma-filled courtroom to a safe, quiet and peaceful place.
While I have very good lawyers who practice in my courtroom,
it is clear to me, that they are working in a respectful and col-
laborative way. It is a place where everyone has the right to be
heard and to have their positions considered. It is a place of
inclusivity, not exclusivity. And, when everyone is included,
they feel like they are part of the solution—they own it and it
works better.
I am thankful and blessed for the opportunity to serve my
community. And the beauty of serving, is that you get so much
more in return. Therefore, with Thanksgiving Day upon us, I
find myself reflecting on things for which I am most thankful. 
I am thankful for a career that is rewarding and fulfilling
and for having realized things that my parents and grandpar-
ents could have only imagined. Obviously, I am thankful for
each day that I open my eyes and live another day with my
health and my senses intact. But, as an African-American
woman, a lawyer, and a judge, and considering all that has
transpired during the past year, I am most thankful that I live
in a state and a country where, at least for the time being,
judges are independent.
When I think about the events of the past year, including
attacks on judges, efforts to strip away judicial independence
by attempting to enact laws that would permit legislators and
even our president to bypass judicial authority to further their
own purposes, I am deeply concerned about the survival of the
independent judiciary. 
Judicial independence means that decisions of the judiciary
should be impartial and not subject to influence from the other
branches of government or from private or political interests.
Sounds like a great idea, doesn’t it? I think so, but there have
recently been efforts to change this doctrine that is rooted in
the history of our nation. While right now, the independence
of our judiciary seems to be intact, understand that efforts to
chip away at or erode judicial independence are likely to con-
tinue. We must therefore educate the public on the importance
of the independent judiciary.
Judicial independence is important to me, not only because
I am a judge, but also because I am a citizen of the United
States, because I am a woman, and because I am a minority. If
judges were not free to make decisions without being sub-
jected to outside influences, I might not be sitting as a judge
today or standing before you as the recipient of this award. If
judges were constantly subjected to outside influence, would
we have had a Brown v. the Board of Education? Without an
independent judiciary, would judges in the South have felt free
to uphold the civil rights legislation of the 60s, which sought
to create equality in all aspects of life for all citizens regardless
of color, gender or economic status? 
Without judicial independence, would judges feel free to
overturn, rule against, or declare unconstitutional laws that
would deny entry into the United States to persons of certain
religious and ethnic groups? Without judicial independence
would we have ever had Roe v. Wade, Loving v. Virginia or
would same sex couples have the constitutional right to
marry? 
In nearly every case, where a judge has to make a decision,
there is a likely to be a winner and a loser. Someone is bound
to walk away unhappy. Sometimes neither party is satisfied.
That is the nature of an adversarial system. Nevertheless, what
is important is the process—that judges make decisions based
upon the law and the evidence and that judges only be
accountable to the Constitution, to the laws of the land and to
the taxpayers that they serve. It is important for all citizens to
know and to believe that regardless of their political standing,
their political power, their race or ethnicity, their gender or
gender identification, their religion, or their economic status,
that they have equal access to justice. For the lawyers in the
room, this is what you should want for your clients. For the
taxpayers in the room, this is what you you should want for
yourselves, your families, friends and neighbors. This is what I
set out to do in every case that is before me. And I want to be
able to do it without threat of political backlash or without
threats from special interest groups.
For some, judicial independence is synonymous with judi-
cial activism and for others it means that there is no way to
hold judges accountable. When a judge is called upon to make
a difficult or unpopular decision, that does not mean that the
judge is an activist, it simply means that the judge is following
the law. Judges are accountable. All decisions made by judges
are on the record or put in writing for the world to review and
inspect. Most cases are heard in open court, in a public setting.
Nearly every decision that trial judges make in a case is subject
to appellate review should a party be unhappy with the deci-
sion. There are also judicial conduct boards, which investigate
complaints made against judges and that take action when
appropriate.
When I think about the prospect of something other than
an independent judiciary, I shudder. I think about the days
during the civil rights era when courageous men and women
were subjected to threats, cross burnings, and violence. I think
about the judges who have lost their lives, who have been
injured, or who have had family members injured or killed
because a party was unhappy with the outcome of a case. If
we lose our independent judiciary, I fear that we would also
lose the opportunity to attract some of our best legal minds to
the bench, for who would want to work in an atmosphere of
undue influence and the threat of impeachment or pay reduc-
tion? 
So, when I give thanks this month and on Thanksgiving
Day, I will be sure to give thanks to my family friends and col-
leagues and all who support me. But, I will also be sure to give
thanks for an independent judiciary. And I hope that I will be
as thankful next year on Thanksgiving Day and for years to
come. Alexander Hamilton, one of the framers of the United
States Constitution, said it best, in The Federalist No. 78.
“There is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated
from the legislative and executive powers. … [L]iberty can
have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have
everything to fear from its union with either of the other
departments.” Well said, Mr. Hamilton—well said.
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ABOUT THE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST AWARD
The William H. Rehnquist Award for Judicial Excellence is one of our nation’s highest judicial 
honors. Presented annually by the National Center for State Courts, this prestigious award honors
a state court judge who demonstrates the outstanding qualities of judicial excellence, including
integrity, fairness, open-mindedness, knowledge of the law, professional ethics, creativity, sound
judgment, intellectual courage, and decisiveness. The William H. Rehnquist Award honors judges
who are taking bold steps to address a variety of issues affecting their communities.
In the fall of each year, the judge receiving this distinguished honor is recognized during an award
ceremony held at the U.S. Supreme Court. The award highlights the judge’s work to provide model
programs for court systems throughout the United States. 
Chief Justice of the United States John G. Roberts Jr. will present the award during an evening 
dinner ceremony on Thursday, November 15, 2018, at the United States Supreme Court.
"His dedication to duty was an inspiration to me, and I know to many others. [Rehnquist] 
reinforced my view that a certain humility should characterize the judicial role. Judges and 
justices are servants of the law, not the other way around."
— CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES JOHN G. ROBERTS JR.
For more information about the nominating process and previous recipients, please visit http://www.ncsc.org/
About-us/Awards/William-H-Rehnquist-Award.aspx.
For more information about the Rehnquist Award Dinner please call 1-800-616-6110.
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9 Bulgarian or Croat
13 ___ fide (genuine)
14 Light bulb, in comics
15 Get closer, with a camera
17 Start of the oft-misquoted Matt. 7:1
20 Something additional
21 Waiting to talk
22 However, for short
25 Calligraphy need
26 ‘60s Pontiac muscle car
27 Nancy Reagan, ___ Davis
28 ___ Bros. (“Casa Blanca” studio)
30 “___ Sera, Sera”
31 Puts into type
32 Active
33 Throat
35 2000 rom-com starring Donal
Logue, directed by Jenniphr Goodman
39 $100 bills, slangily
40 Valentine decoration
42 Sampras of the court
45 NEA ad, maybe
46 “The Wizard of Oz” setting
47 Wilder’s “___ Town”
48 Golf ball’s platform
49 Raggedy doll
50 “___ Beso” (1962 Paul Anka hit)
51 Darwin’s “The ___ of Species”
53 Hospital area for patients about to
have surgery
55 1938 Bertolt Brecht play about the
life of a 17th-century astronomer (Ger.)
60 Sport with clay pigeons
BIG SHOES TO FILL by Judge Victor Fleming







64 Summer, in Lyon
61 “The Man with the Golden Gun”
actress Adams
62 Many a mall rat
63 Pops, as a question
64 Sporty trucks
65 Polio vaccine discoverer
Down
1 Lunch with Peter Pan, perhaps,
familiarly
2 Debtor’s note
3 Last word in movies?
4 Go bananas
5 Cold season
6 Enhance with decorations
7 Greek-salad topper
8 Do lacy thread work




12 Part of ROY G. BIV
16 Some Degas subjects
18 Some witnesses
19 Monopoly assets
22 Bygone intl. carrier
23 “... why ___ thou forsaken me?”




31 17th century painter Jan
33 Mother ___
34 Grain alcohol
36 Add, as an exhibit to a pleading
37 Flower vessel
38 Blocks of time
41 Chicken general?
42 Places for swimming
43 Cry of discovery ... and town
in 46-Across
44 Chickasaw and Choctaw
46 Works on, as dough
48 Colors slightly
49 Debate
52 Nerd or dweeb equivalent
53 High-school jr.’s ordeal
54 Fruit centers
56 Ostrich’s cousin
Vic Fleming is a district judge in 
Little Rock, Arkansas. 
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Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American Judges Associa-
tion, invites the submission of unsolicited, original articles, essays,
and book reviews. Court Review seeks to provide practical, useful
information to the working judges of the United States and Canada.
In each issue, we hope to provide information that will be of use to
judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting new proce-
dures or methods of trial, court, or case management, providing sub-
stantive information regarding an area of law likely to encountered
by many judges, or by providing background information (such as
psychology or other social science research) that can be used by
judges in their work.
Court Review is received by the 2,000 members of the American
Judges Association (AJA), as well as many law libraries. About 40
percent of the members of the AJA are general-jurisdiction, state trial
judges. Another 40 percent are limited-jurisdiction judges, including
municipal court and other specialized court judges. The remainder
include federal trial judges, state and federal appellate judges, and
administrative-law judges.
Articles: Articles should be submitted in double-spaced text with
footnotes in Microsoft Word format. The suggested article length for
Court Review is between 18 and 36 pages of double-spaced text
(including the footnotes). Footnotes should conform to the current
edition of The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation. Articles
should be of a quality consistent with better state-bar-association law
journals and/or other law reviews.
Essays: Essays should be submitted in the same format as articles.
Suggested length is between 6 and 12 pages of double-spaced text
(including any footnotes).
Book Reviews: Book reviews should be submitted in the same for-
mat as articles. Suggested length is between 3 and 9 pages of double-
spaced text (including any footnotes).
Pre-commitment: For previously published authors, we will con-
sider making a tentative publication commitment based upon an
article outline. In addition to the outline, a comment about the spe-
cific ways in which the submission will be useful to judges and/or
advance scholarly discourse on the subject matter would be appreci-
ated. Final acceptance for publication cannot be given until a com-
pleted article, essay, or book review has been received and reviewed
by the Court Review editor or board of editors.
Editing: Court Review reserves the right to edit all manuscripts. 
Submission: Submissions should be made by email. Please send
them to Editors@CourtReview.org. Submissions will be acknowl-
edged by email. Notice of acceptance, rejection, or requests for
changes will be sent following review.
Court Review Author Submission Guidelines
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NEW PUBLICATIONS
Jon O. Newman Benched: Abortion, Ter-
rorists, Drones, Crooks, Supreme Court,
Kennedy, Nixon, Demi Moore, and Other
Tales from the Life a Federal Judge,.
William S. Hein & Co., Inc., 2017. 306
pp. ($29.95). 
https://www.wshein.com.
In contrast to many memoirs now
being published, Benched is not the story
of a miserable childhood, a struggle
against enormous odds, or escape from a
dysfunctional family. Rather, its author,
Judge Jon O. Newman, tells of his bal-
anced and uncommonly productive life,
much of it spent as a federal judge for the
district court and then the court of
appeals for the Second Circuit.   
Judge Newman’s path to the federal
appellate bench was paved with well-con-
nected mentors, who seemed eager to
provide him with opportunity after
opportunity. However, the book shows
that this “charmed” career was the result
not just of luck, but of his obvious com-
petence and deep willingness to take on
thankless duties. Judge Newman
attended Princeton University and Yale
Law School and then served as a law
clerk on the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals. This clerkship led, remarkably,
to an offer to serve as a clerk for Chief
Justice Earl Warren, even though he had
not formally applied for the position. The
section on his time at the Court provides
a fascinating, if all-too-brief, glimpse of
its workings at the time. 
The tales from the bench, including
his important cases involving abortion,
are more interesting from the years before
his appointment to the appellate court,
where even big cases with big names, can
be fairly dry. What shines in the latter
part of the book is the clarity of Judge
Newman’s mind and his ability to explain
complicated legal issues clearly and con-
cisely. In sum, the book offers an enter-
taining mix of political history, legal
insights, war stories, and a glimpse inside
the mind of a happy judge. 
Andrea L. Miller, Expertise Fails to Atten-
uate Gendered Biases in Judicial Decision-
Making, SOC. PSYCHOL. AND PERSONALITY
SCI. I-8 (8 pp)(Sage 2018). 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/
10.1177/1948550617741181
Professor Andrea L. Miller, a social
psychologist at the University of Illinois,
conducted a set of controlled experiences
in which trial court judges and laypeople
evaluated a hypothetical child custody
case and a hypothetical employment dis-
crimination case. Professor Miller com-
pared judges’ and laypeople’s decision
making and determined that judges were
no less influenced by litigant gender and
their own gender ideology than were
laypeople, suggesting that expertise does
not attenuate gendered biases in legal
decision making.
Arizona Task Force on Digital Evidence
Issues Report
In 2016 Arizona’s Supreme Court
directed the creation of a Task Force on
Court Management of Digital Evidence
(Hon. Samuel A. Thumma, Chair). Their
report is available at http://www.azcourts.
gov/cscommittees/Digital-Evidence-Task-
Force and published in 13 WASH. J. L.,
TECH. & ARTS 2 (Winter 2018)
(http://hdl.handle.net/ 1773.1/1788). The
report includes 10 recommendations for
how to approach the issue of digital evi-
dence. Among them:
A standardized definition of basic
terms used throughout rules of court,
such as what exactly is “digital evidence,”
“electronic evidence,” “video,” etc.
Standardized set of formats and tech-
nical protocols for all courts and cases in
the state along with a rules change
requiring all digital evidence to be submit
in the standard format(s).
Deciding where and how the digital
evidence is to be stored.
Amending court rules to balance pub-
lic access to court records with the rights




The National Center for State Courts
has launched a webpage, Opioids and the
Courts, as an online resource center to
provide courts with materials and infor-
mation about how best to respond to the
opioid epidemic. Currently, the page pro-
vides statistics, a news roundup, and list-
ings of available resources, including
child welfare, medication-assisted treat-
ment, and recommendations from
national organizations. Materials devel-
oped and collected by the National Judi-
cial Opioid Task Force will be located on
this site as they are developed. Task Force
co-chairs are Indiana Chief Justice
Loretta Rush and Tennessee State Court
Administrator Deborah Taylor Tate.
http://www.ncsc.org/opioidsandcourts.
The National Center for State Courts
has a Resource Center on "Improving
Relationships with ICE." Among other
resources, the site contains information
from judges and justice stakeholders
throughout the U.S., DOJ and DHS state-
ments and materials, reference materials
concerning the authority of courts to
limit access to premises or information,
state and local procedures and initiatives,
and references to resources to understand
potential legal or ethical issues related to




The Cyberviolence Court Training Ini-
tiative referenced on the Resource Page in
Court Review Vol. 53:1 is underway, and
webinars and in-person trainings are
available for judicial officers around the
U.S. If you are interested in attending a
webinar or in-person training, contact
the National Network to End Domestic
Violence, www.nnedv.org or the Safety
Net Project at www.techsafety.org for
information about upcoming events.
The Resource Page
g
